Externalism says that many ordinary mental contents are constituted by relations to things outside the mental subject’s head. An infl uential objection says that externalism is incompatible with our commonsense belief in mental causation, because such extrinsic relations cannot play the important causal role in producing behavior that we ordinarily think mental content plays.An extremely common response is that it is simply obvious, from examples of ordinary causal processes, that extrinsic relations can play the desired causal role. In this paper (...) I argue that such examples show no such thing, and that the only reason to think they do is to endorse an unacceptable principle concerning the sufficient conditions for causal efficacy. Internalists might be wrong that externalism is incompatible with mental causation; but the most common defense against that allegation should not move us at all. (shrink)

Large deletions and genomic re‐arrangements are increasingly recognized as common products of double‐strand break repair at Clustered Regularly Interspaced, Short Palindromic Repeats ‐ CRISPR associated protein 9 (CRISPR/Cas9) on‐target sites. Together with well‐known off‐target editing products from Cas9 target misrecognition, these are important limitations, that need to be addressed. Rigorous assessment of Cas9‐editing is necessary to ensure validity of observed phenotypes in Cas9‐edited cell‐lines and model organisms. Here the mechanisms of Cas9 specificity, and strategies to assess and mitigate unwanted effects (...) of Cas9 editing are reviewed; covering guide‐RNA design, RNA modifications, Cas9 modifications, control of Cas9 activity; computational prediction for off‐targets, and experimental methods for detecting Cas9 cleavage. Although recognition of the prevalence of on‐ and off‐target effects of Cas9 editing has increased in recent years, broader uptake across the gene editing community will be important in determining the specificity of Cas9 across diverse applications and organisms. (shrink)

Externalism says that many ordinary mental contents are constituted by relations to things outside the mental subject’s head. An infl uential objection says that externalism is incompatible with our commonsense belief in mental causation, because such extrinsic relations cannot play the important causal role in producing behavior that we ordinarily think mental content plays.An extremely common response is that it is simply obvious, from examples of ordinary causal processes, that extrinsic relations can play the desired causal role. In this paper (...) I argue that such examples show no such thing, and that the only reason to think they do is to endorse an unacceptable principle concerning the sufficient conditions for causal efficacy. Internalists might be wrong that externalism is incompatible with mental causation; but the most common defense against that allegation should not move us at all. (shrink)