In later antiquity few monuments at Athens had such a great reputation as what the Athenians called with pride the Altar of Eleos or Pity, the suppliants' altar. Philostratos links it in fame with Olympia and Delphi. The Athenians pay homage to Eleos along with Athena Polias, says Sopatros. ‘You have an Altar of Eleos’, says Apsines to the Athenians; ‘…for this you have a great reputation amongst all other men.’.

Resumo Pretendemos, neste artigo, expor a noção trágica nietzschiana na conferência O Drama Musical Grego e os fragmentos póstumos escritos no mesmo período, mostrando que o desenvolvimento dessa concepção caminha peri passu à crítica ao pensamento moderno. Essa crítica é realizada por meio do conceito de ecstase, o qual se confronta com a ideia de tragédia entendida a partir da poesia, Deste modo, exporemos como Nietzsche articula o seu conceito de ecstase como um contraponto à compreensão moderna da “Poética” de (...) Aristóteles, assim como as suas aproximações e distanciamentos da filosofia schopenhaueriana ao formular sua concepção trágica. Abtract In this article we intend to expose the nietzschean tragic notion in the conference The Greek Musical Drama and the posthumous fragments written in the same period, showing that the development of this conception goes peri passu to criticism of modern thought. This criticism is made through the concept of ecstase, which confronts the idea of tragedy understood from poetry. In this way, we will expose how Nietzsche articulates his concept of ecstase as a counterpoint to the modern understanding of Aristotle's Poetics, as well as his approximations and distances from Schopenhauer's philosophy in formulating his tragic conception. (shrink)

La poética de Aristóteles gira alrededor de la definición de tragedia, y de un análisis de la construcción del Mythos, su contenido y sus exigencias formales. Así, la mímesis se liga a lo universal, lo verosímil y/o lo necesario; penetra en el plano de lo efectual, determinante en la consideración de lo trágico. De ello se desprende un diferencial platónico en la consideración de la Mímesis. El texto penetra el contenido de la Catharsis, término apenas mencionado en la definición de (...) tragedia pero en el que se contiene la fuerza problematizada de la concepción aristotélica de la poesía. Al final se intenta relacionar dicha noción con el Eleos (compasión) y el Phobos (temor), que soportan el carácter comunitario del quehacer poético. (shrink)

이 글은 플라톤과 아리스토텔레스의 연민(eleos)과 부정의(adikia)의 상관관계에 대한 견해를 비교하여 고찰한다. 특히 부정의한 행위의 비자발성 논제에 관한 두 철학자의 상반된 견해를 검토한다. 먼저 부정의한 자의 행위를 비자발적인 것으로 보면서 그에 대한 연민을 주장하는 플라톤의 견해를 검토한다. 그래서 부정의 한 행위가 비자발적인 것으로 간주되는 근본적인 원인이 무교육(amathia)에 의한 무지(agnoia)에 있음을 밝힌다. 다음으로 아리스토텔레스의 부정의한 자의 행위에 대한 연민을 부정하는 이유를 살펴본다. 특히 부정의한 자의 품성의 비자발성의 근거로 제시되는 플라톤의 무교육 주장에 대해 아리스토텔레스적인 답변이 어떻게 가능한지를 어린아이의 초기교육과 성인의 교육단계에 초점을 (...) 맞추어 고찰한다. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aristotle on Thought and Feeling by Paula GottliebCorinne GartnerPaula Gottlieb. Aristotle on Thought and Feeling. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Pp. 173. Hardback, $99.99.Paula Gottlieb's recent book is an illuminating, synoptic study of Aristotle's theory of human motivation, according to which his innovative notion of prohairesis (choice)—specifically, the virtuous agent's prohairesis—is the cornerstone. She argues against both Kantian-flavored readings, which prioritize reason's role in motivating ethical action, and (...) Humean-flavored readings, which emphasize the virtuous agent's well-habituated feelings. Gottlieb's account explains how the virtuous agent's prohairesis incorporates his or her feelings, desires, and thoughts, building in the motivational contributions of both the rational and nonrational parts of the psyche. The resulting treatment does justice to Aristotle's prima facie incongruous characterizations of prohairesis: on the one hand, it is the conclusion of deliberation, an explicitly rational process; on the other, it is an expression of character virtue.Although prohairesis is the unifying focus of the book, Gottlieb's project touches on a number of related controversies concerning Aristotle's ethics, including the process of moral habituation, the thorny phenomenon of akrasia, the relationship between contemplation and practically virtuous activity, and how to conceive of the connection between the aesthetic and ethical sides of to kalon (the fine). And it does so in a way that is attuned to ongoing scholarly debates without getting bogged down in them. Similarly, while she primarily concerns herself with the Nicomachean Ethics, Gottlieb helpfully draws upon material from other parts of the corpus—for example, she invokes, with appropriate caveats, Aristotle's discussion of feelings in the Rhetoric as well as De Anima. Lastly, some interesting subsidiary motifs animate the book, perhaps the most novel and provocative of which is the through line that connects her insightful understanding of eleos—which she translates, with helpful qualifications, as "sympathy" rather than "pity" (31)—with learning to be virtuous, as her fresh reading of Aristotle's Neoptolemus case exemplifies (98–102, 134–35). According to Gottlieb's hybridized picture of the good person's motivation, in the rational part of the soul the agent's wish is channeled via deliberation, which itself involves situation-specific information from the feelings, into the agent's prohairesis. In the nonrational part of the soul, the agent experiences a feeling that, strictly speaking, includes (a) a physiological component; (b) an impression of the circumstances, itself partly shaped by the agent's thought; and (c) a specific desire (chapter 2). The virtuous agent's nonrational desire will always correspond to—indeed, it, too, is channeled into—his or her prohairesis (79), the unified desiderative thought or thoughtful desire (NE VI.2, 1139b4–5), from which he or she then acts (chapter 4). The virtuous agent never experiences even mild psychic conflict, having a fully integrated soul whose two parts are in perfect harmony.At some points of Gottlieb's discussion, it seems as if all of these psychic components involved in the production of an action actually constitute the agent's prohairesis, while in other places it seems as though prohairesis is the discrete desiderative product. If one adopts the former conception, it is difficult to make sense of Aristotle's claim that the choice of the akratic agent, who acts on his or her errant nonrational desire, is correct. It turns out that the akratic agent's choice is correct because he or she has rightly judged what he or she should do, but it is distinct in composition from the good person's choice, since it does not [End Page 703] include his or her nonrational desire. One consequence of Gottlieb's view is thus that, as she indicates, the good person's prohairesis is sui generis. Another consequence is that, within the nonrational part of the soul, there may be physiological responses plus accompanying impressions (phantasiai) that, it seems, contain "motivational oomph" (40) but do not get channeled into desires. While her view avoids conflating the virtuous agent and the enkratic agent (who, despite acting correctly, experiences an occurrent nonrational desire to the contrary), there may be cases in which the virtuous... (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article aims to bring some understanding to the phenomenon called compassion. The use of particular linguistic expressions to denote the phenomenon of compassion in the East and West can confuse us, as those terms are embedded in unique cultural settings. This article undertakes a historical, etymological, and philosophical exploration of the terms, compassion and karuna. The article will include a short literature review of these concepts and an investigation of the differences and similarities between them. The concluding speculation is (...) that the Western perspective on compassion is founded on an individualistic, self-centred vision, and the karuna of the East is founded on a communitarian, non-self based vision. (shrink)

Nietzsche penetrates behind any rational discussion to its affective ground, but though he goes deeper than Gadamer's fusion of horizons, he nevertheless fails to acknowledge any other affective disposition besides the will to power. Hence for him Gadamer's Sichverständigung, or reaching an understanding, is fiction. In contrast, Gadamer's Zugehörigkeit, a sense of kinship, and Nachlassen, relenting, suggest not only the possibility of reaching an understanding but its real, affective ground. Two passages from Homer's Iliad illustrate how Nietzsche might penetrate behind (...) Gadamer's intellectualism yet how, at the same time, Gadamer ultimately gets beyond Nietzsche. In Book I, Achilles and Agamemnon can get no further than strife because of their pathos of rage and hostility. Here Nietzsche's will to power explains their altercation entirely. On the other hand, when Achilles is confronted with the devastated Priam in book XXIV, philia and eleos, kinship and mercy, replace his anger; and with the corresponding affective shift in Priam from fear of Achilles to his own feelings of kinship and forgiveness, antipathy becomes sympathy. Only this fusion of affect allows them to reach an understanding. (shrink)