Wesley Salmon has recently proposed a new theory of scientific explanation based on a model which he calls the statistical-relevance model. It is intended primarily as an account of the structure of explanations of particular events--explanations which, according to Salmon, are very often motivated largely by practical concerns. Two important features of this account are the concepts of homogeneity and screening off. In this paper we argue that the employment of these two concepts (which, in fact, are intimately connected) is (...) fundamentally at odds with the desire to capture everyday explanations of the practical sort, and that it leads instead to an account in which the only satisfactory explanations are those expressed in the very deepest physical terms. (shrink)

A popular conception of probability for many years now has been the relative frequency interpretation, made famous by the work of Reichenbach and von Mises, and more recently by Salmon and others. The frequency view has played important roles of various sorts in virtually every area in epistemology and the philosophy of science, including explanation, causation, the justification of induction, the nature of laws and lawlike statements, and so on. A major attraction of the frequency conception has been its claim (...) to be a strictly empirical view. In this paper we argue that on prima facie grounds the frequency view violates some of our deepest intuitions regarding the notions of probability and possibility. (shrink)

A popular conception of probability for many years now has been the relative frequency interpretation, made famous by the work of Reichenbach and von Mises, and more recently by Salmon and others. The frequency view has played important roles of various sorts in virtually every area in epistemology and the philosophy of science, including explanation, causation, the justification of induction, the nature of laws and lawlike statements, and so on. A major attraction of the frequency conception has been its claim (...) to be a strictly empirical view. In this paper we argue that on prima facie grounds the frequency view violates some of our deepest intuitions regarding the notions of probability and possibility. (shrink)