At the heart of the human experience lies anxiety caused by the realization that the world is unknown, forever eluding our control. And out of this anxiety arise the master passions of ambition and envy, which we repress to mask their power over our lives. Discussion of the role of the emotions in our lives is not new, but Mihnea Moldoveanu and Nitin Nohria go much further, showing how these passions shape not only our individual lives but our social and (...) organizational culture as well.The master passions are not pretty, and so we cover them with the more socially acceptable faces of reason and morality. Moldoveanu and Nohria guide the reader in revealing the real impetus behind such actions as firing a friend, leaving a lover, or even pillaging your own people. Below the rational explanation, they show, often lies a willingness to hurt or even destroy others to fuel our own ambitions or quench the fires of envy. The authors offer intriguing thought experiments and examples from their own lives as they expose the power of the master passions. Deftly weaving ideas from psychology, sociology, literature, and philosophy with the personal, they build a strong argument that society would be much healthier if we faced the deception and self-deception that pervade our lives. (shrink)

Can we explain the advantage natural languages enjoy over ideographies in a way that enables us to attempt the design of an ideography that “works”? I deploy an adapted version of Shannon's source- and channel-coding partitioning of a communication system to explain the communicative dynamics and shortfalls of ideographies, and reveal ways in which entrenchable, generalist ideographies could be designed.

Depending on what we mean by “explanation,” challenges to the explanatory depth and reach of deep neural network models of visual and other forms of intelligent behavior may need revisions to both the elementary building blocks of neural nets (the explananda) and to the ways in which experimental environments and training protocols are engineered (the explanantia). The two paths assume and imply sharply different conceptions of how an explanation explains and of the explanatory function of models.

I argue for a more complicated but nonetheless computationally feasible and algorithmically intelligible interplay between exploration and exploitation and for admitting into our conceptual toolkit regimes of exploitative exploration and exploratory exploitation that can enhance the novelty and usefulness of the results of either problemistic or serendipitous search.

Frames for interpreting situations are necessary in the face of time constraints for action and indeterminacy of the “right or optimal thing to do” given multiple objectives but not all frames are equally useful. We need a way of modeling representational frames according to the informational gain of using them and the computational cost of synthesizing a decisive reason for acting from them.