This article explores the development of ideas in constitutional design. The point of departure is a perspective of constitutions-as-products, and thus, an examination of the invention, innovation, and an uptake of these products. The article conceptualizes constitutional innovation and distinguishes its manifestations with respect to constitutional products, the process of constitution-making, and in supporting institutions. The last two elements, in line with Schumpeter’s approach to innovation, would seem especially important to constitutional development. The article provides several examples from the area (...) of human rights and argues that innovations tend to be found in situations in which there is strong aversion to a prior order. It also shows that innovations tend to come from the periphery rather than the global core of the field. One of the sources of “mixed” constitutions is precisely such innovations, which then form raw material for further mixing. (shrink)

Democracies and authoritarian regimes have different approaches to international law, grounded in their different forms of government. As the balance of power between democracies and non-democracies shifts, it will have consequences for international legal order. Human rights may face severe challenges in years ahead, but citizens of democratic countries may still benefit from international legal cooperation in other areas. Ranging across several continents, this volume surveys the state of democracy-enhancing international law, and provides ideas for a way forward in the (...) face of rising authoritarianism. (shrink)

Though nominally exercised on behalf of private citizens, constitutional judicial review does perform an insurance function for politicians who expect to lose power in future elections. This paper discusses the various dimensions of institutional design of constitutional courts and argues that the extent and power of judicial review can be expected to increase relative to the degree of political uncertainty at the time of constitutional design. The paper then develops a simple empirical test of this hypothesis using data from Eastern (...) Europe, regressing measures for various aspects of court design on the strength of the largest party in the legislature. The paper shows that the design of constitutional courts reflects the interests of the dominant political parties and that independent and powerful courts are associated with situations of divided or deadlocked politics. (shrink)

This article deals with the gamut of international law. Empirical research on international law, charts three main factors—states and bureaucracies, private actors, and international institutions, specifically international tribunals. International law maintains the centrality of the state, which is also the functioning ground for various sub-state structures, governmental actors, and institutions. Private actors such as corporations and non-governmental organizations are instrumental in influencing the construction and outcome of international law. Regarding the relevance of international laws, some opine that while states do (...) infact deliver on obligations, they only choose those that are easy to comply by. Hence, efficiency becomes doubtful. Further, it is claimed that state's compliance only reflects its intentions, not a behavioral shift. These opinions merit questions regarding the relevance of international law. Studies in this field concern, broadly, international human rights law, criminal law, war laws, trade laws, investment law, and regulatory laws. (shrink)

Our era is one of democratic backsliding. International courts and institutions have provided some bulwark against this trend, but we are now witnessing leaders seeking to use international law to extend their power. Courts in several countries have relied on international human rights norms to facilitate term limit extensions by leaders seeking to retain power beyond what is constitutionally allowed. This Article documents these cases and calls for a more robust and substantive international law of democracy-protection.

How does a democracy that has survived a close brush with authoritarianism start to recreate conditions of meaningful democratic political competition? What steps are to be taken, and in what order? Certain lessons can be gleaned from comparative experience with the challenges of “front-sliding”—that is, the process of rebuilding the necessary political, legal, epistemic, and sociological components of democracy. This essay maps out those challenges, examines the distinctive and difficult question of punishing individuals who have been drivers of democratic backsliding, (...) and reflects on how to sequence different elements of front-sliding. (shrink)