The dispute between Kantians and Humeans over whether practical reason can justify moral reasons for all agents is often characterized as a debate over whether reasons are hypothetical or categorical. Instead, this debate must be understood in terms of the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons. This paper considers Alan Gewirth’s Reason and Morality as a case study of a Kantian justification of morality focused on deriving categorical reasons from hypothetical reasons. The case study demonstrates first, the possibility of categorical (...) agent-relative reasons, and second, that inattention to this possibility has caused considerable confusion in the debate between Kantians and Humeans. (shrink)

Procedural theories of practical reasoning provide rules according to which agents' reasons for action are constructed. Those procedures operate on some given input (an agent's desires, other mental states, and circumstances) to the reasoning process in a way that determines the output of an agent's reasons for action. I argue that a procedural theory of practical reasoning must include a previously unrecognized normative restriction on what counts as acceptable input, roughly, that agents should take features of their own, but not (...) others', selves as input. Using Korsgaard's The Sources of Normativity as a case study, I show that common features of procedural theories result in a threat to each person's view of themselves as practically distinct from others. I then show that psychological claims are insufficient to defeat this threat, and that maintaining a practical distinction between ourselves and others requires a normative restriction on the input to practical reflection. (shrink)

Typical justifications of prudence are based on the fact that we are temporally extended agents who remain numerically identical over time. After showing that prudential considerations should instead be based on our identity at a particular time, I outline a normative context for prudential reasons, based on a present commitment to temporal neutrality. I then consider how contingency in the content of a present commitment to temporal neutrality provides a flexible context that can help to resolve current debates about whether (...) agents are required to maximize value, maximin value, minimax loss or are required to conform to any of a host of other options on how to adjudicate various types of conflict between present and future values. (shrink)