This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to uncover the stochastic structure of individual preferences over lotteries. Unlike previous experiments, which have presented subjects with pair-wise choices between lotteries, our design allowed subjects to choose between two lotteries or (virtually) any convex combination of the two lotteries. We interpret the mixtures of lotteries chosen by subjects as a measure of the stochastic structure of choice. We test between two alternative interpretations of stochastic choice: the random utility interpretation and (...) the deterministic preferences interpretation. The main findings of the experiment are that the typical subject prefers mixtures of lotteries rather than the extremes of a linear lottery choice set. The distribution of choices does not change between a first and second asking of the same question. We argue that this provides support for the deterministic preferences interpretation over the random utility interpretation of stochastic choice. As a subsidiary result, we find a small proportion of subjects make choices that violate transitivity, but the level of intransitive choice falls significantly over time. (shrink)

Analogies between biological and cultural evolution may be illuminating and suggest methods to pursue in the quest for a unified science of cultural evolution. Significant progress, however, is unlikely to be made by trying to fit cultural evolution neatly into a biological evolution schema. A key element defining and differentiating cultural evolution may be the role of conscious human choices. (Published Online November 9 2006).

Resumen En este texto se intenta mostrar que la radicalización de la tesis expresada por Platón en el libro X de la República no permite "apreciar" el valor que el filósofo ateniense sabe que posee la poesía, pues ella podría ser un medio para el ejercicio reflexivo si se sirve de la sobriedad que la filosofía propone. Para realizar esta tarea es menester trazar tres puntos sobre los cuales gira este texto: primero, se ubica al lector en la discusión entre (...) poesía y filosofía para comprender el contexto de la crisis entre estos dos factores de la educación en la antigüedad griega; segundo, se aborda la crítica establecida en el libro X sobre la falta de rigor que muestran los poetas en la búsqueda del conocimiento; finalmente se vislumbra o abre una posibilidad interpretativa acerca del interés que puede tener la proposición de una "poesía filosófica" en la obra de Platón.The following text will try to show that radicalization of the thesis expressed by Plato in the book X does not allow "to "estímate" the value that the Athenian philo-sopher knows that poetry possesses, since poetry might be a means for the reflexive exercise if it takes advantage of the sobriety that philosophy proposes. To carry out this task it is necessary to define three points on which this paper will be about: first, the author will inform the reader about the old discussion among poetry and philosophy to understand the context of the crisis between these two forms of teaching; Second, criticism established in the book X on the lack of rigor in the search of knowledge that poets have will be addressed. Finally, the paper glimpses or opens an interpretive possibility about the interest that the proposition of a "philosophical poetry" can have in Plato's work. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Buddhism and humanistic-Marxism have much in common, and that they really are quite complementary in many ways. Early on I cite the Dalai Lama and some remarks he makes in relation to Buddhism and Marxism—remarks that seem not to make a distinction between orthodox-Marxism and humanistic-Marxism. I then go on to give a brief sketch of some of the central aspects of humanistic-Marxism; and in doing 50 I draw from a number of well-known Eastern (...) European philo-sophers. Among other things, I focus on the relation between the early and late Marx, "praxis", 'free conscious activity", historical materialism, the spiritual dimension in Marx and its role in social transformations, etc. After a brief indication of the Buddhist "four noble truths", I bring out that both Marx and Buddha are deeply concerned about human suffering; but that there is an important difference in emphasis with respect to the external and internal Factors associated with human suffering. I go on to bring out that both perspectives agree that there is no creator God, or eternal soul; and that both perspectives see reality as process in character. For each perspective this means that things are what they are by virtue of the dynamic interrelations they have with other things. whether directly and indirectly. I bring out that both perspectives begin their analysis of the human condition with the given situation in which human beings find themselves, and that both perspectives see human beings as the makers of themselves, but that they do so in somewhat different ways. Also both perspectives see human beings as making themselves on the basis of the ways they have made themselves in the past, but as doing so in ways that are not fatalistic. In this connection I compare the Buddhist view of karma, and an overlapping view of social karma in Marx. Also I discuss Buddhism ancj Marxism with respect to the notion of the ego-self, and the question of whether there are many different forms of the ego-self; and if so, how such different forms might come about, and what this would mean in relation to the Buddhist notion of ''samsara". Finally,! point to a way that humanistic-Marxism could consistently acknowledge a possible transcendence of the ego-self. In passing I point out that the notion of "unalienated spirituality" in Marx has much in common with the Buddhist notion of "enlightenment". (shrink)

Aesthetic theories, like theories of morals, are roughly divisible into those that maintain an analytic neutrality and those that attempt to arrive at “first-order”, practical judgments. A philo sopher of language may confine the legitimate task of aesthetics to the clarification of talk about works of art and about the fashioning of works of art. But other aestheticians, perhaps a more numerous group, see their study as far more intimately related to art criticism, and as able, without the committing (...) of naturalistic or any other fallacies, to reach particular aesthetic value-judgments. Between these extreme positions lies a great diversity of theories which, while clearly differentiating aesthetics from art criticism, still carry practical implications of a general kind. The conceptual scaffolding into which they fit the art-forms, their notion of what is central to aesthetic experience and what peripheral, their account of artistic creativity-all these can be indirectly evaluative, can subtly influence and alter one's responses to actual aesthetic objects. (shrink)

My paper focuses on the pursuit of philosophical self-perfection. The starting point of my reflections is my experience with contemporary philosophy. Mainstream contemporary phi-losophy counsels the rational capacities of arguing and reasoning without affecting the philo-sopher′s ethical stance. I argue that this failure is due to the presuppositions made by contem-porary philosophical rationality: the agnostic belief in humankind as source of all existing sense. This agnosticism blinds one to a teleologically defined horizon of truth which is essen-tial for the (...) philosophical streaming for self-perfection. In order to regain the possibility of philosophical self-perfection I am looking for a reversion in faith. I find help in Pascal′s theory of liturgy. At the end of my proposal I try to show how a teleological horizon of truth in the Christian tradition enables philosophical self-perfection which has been abandoned by the agnostic contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

Aesthetic theories, like theories of morals, are roughly divisible into those that maintain an analytic neutrality and those that attempt to arrive at “first-order”, practical judgments. A philo sopher of language may confine the legitimate task of aesthetics to the clarification of talk about works of art and about the fashioning of works of art. But other aestheticians, perhaps a more numerous group, see their study as far more intimately related to art criticism, and as able, without the committing (...) of naturalistic or any other fallacies, to reach particular aesthetic value-judgments. Between these extreme positions lies a great diversity of theories which, while clearly differentiating aesthetics from art criticism, still carry practical implications of a general kind. The conceptual scaffolding into which they fit the art-forms, their notion of what is central to aesthetic experience and what peripheral, their account of artistic creativity-all these can be indirectly evaluative, can subtly influence and alter one's responses to actual aesthetic objects. (shrink)

So the philosopher's way to be is the source (Quelle) of his values and of his basic model; it is an important way of understanding thrall. It appears, now, that the thought of this paper could be simplified. The primary notion is the philosopher's "way to be." Style, locus of interest, nisus and way of thought can then be seen as growing out of this, as particular aspects or expressions of it. This entire paper then would be an attempt to (...) come to grips with the primary notion. How is a "way to be" related to what is normally called a philo sopher's views or theories (the formulable core)? Is it not irrelevant as non-implicatory fact, like biographical details or social background? I do not think so. A philosopher's way to be is not external fact to the formulable core of his thought. It is not "internal" either in the logical sense. It is what allows us to comprehend his explicit views. (shrink)

Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion is not a book to leave one indifferent. Those who are persuaded by its argument or inspired by its message are prone to manifest the same enthusiasm as Georges Cattaui who praised it as one of the greatest and wisest books conceived by philo sophers. Even those who take exception to the doctrine it expounds are impelled to acknowledge its significance. It was in his critique of Les Deux Sources that (...) Jacques Maritain was moved to call the philosophy of Henri Bergson one of the most daring and profound of our time. When many years ago I opened Les Deux Sources for the first time, I turned out of curiosity to the last page and beheld these words, "l'univers... est une machine it faire des dieux." Bergson was an evolutionist, but surely this was no ordinary evolutionist speaking, I thought. What must be the moral philosophy of a man who would write these words? When much later I undertook the present study, it was this same question which con cerned me. (shrink)