Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 29 (5):295 (1976)
|Abstract||It is no part of my purpose in this paper to advocate Minimal Foundationalism. In fact I believe there to be strong objections to any form of foundationalism, and I feel that some kind of coherence or contextualist theory will provide a more adequate general orientation in epistemology. Will and Lehrer are to be commended for providing, in their different ways, important insights into some possible ways of developing a nonfoundationalist epistemology. Nevertheless if foundationalism is to be successfully disposed of it must be attacked in its most defensible, not in its most vulnerable, form. Although Will and Lehrer reveal weaknesses in historically important forms of foundationalism, it has been my aim in this paper to show that their arguments leave untouched the more modest and less vulnerable form I have called ‘Minimal Foundationalism’, a form approximated to by the most prominent contemporary versions of the position. It is to be hoped that those who are interested in clearing the decks for an epistemology without foundations will turn their critical weapons against such modest and careful foundationalists as Chisholm, Danto, and Quinton|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
William P. Alston (1976). Two Types of Foundationalism. Journal of Philosophy 73 (7):165-185.
William Hasker (2010). Alston on the Rationality of Doxastic Practices. Faith and Philosophy 27 (2):205-211.
Chris Tucker (2006). Hermeneutics as A...Foundationalism? Dialogue 45 (04):627-46.
Michael Bergmann (2004). What's NOT Wrong with Foundationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):161–165.
Robert Schroer (2008). Memory Foundationalism and the Problem of Unforgotten Carelessness. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):74–85.
Peter Tramel (2008). Haack's Foundherentism is a Foundationalism. Synthese 160 (2):215 - 228.
Dirk-Martin Grube (1995). Religious Experience After the Demise of Foundationalism. Religious Studies 31 (1):37 - 52.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1984). What is Wrong with Minimal Foundationalism? Erkenntnis 21 (2):175-184.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1986). The Confusion Over Foundationalism. Philosophia 16 (3-4):345-354.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads218 ( #1,372 of 739,352 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #26,322 of 739,352 )
How can I increase my downloads?