Humans should be individualistic and utility-maximizing, but not necessarily “rational”
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):154-155 (2003)
| Abstract | One reason why humans don't behave according to standard game theoretical rationality is because it's not realistic to assume that everyone else is behaving rationally. An individual is expected to have psychological mechanisms that function to maximize his/her long-term payoffs in a world of potentially “irrational” individuals. Psychological decision theory has to be individualistic because individuals make decisions, not groups. | |||||||||
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