The impairment argument for the immorality of abortion: A reply

Bioethics 33 (6):723-724 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In his recent article Perry Hendricks presents what he calls the impairment argument to show that abortion is immoral. To do so, he argues that to give a fetus fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral. Because killing the fetus impairs it more than giving it fetal alcohol syndrome, Hendricks concludes that killing the fetus must also be immoral. Here, I claim that killing a fetus does not impair it in the way that giving it fetal alcohol syndrome does. By examining the reason why giving a fetus this condition is wrong, I conclude that the same reasoning, on common pro‐choice accounts, does not apply to killing the fetus. Accordingly, Hendricks's argument does not succeed in showing abortion is immoral.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,829

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Harm, Sharm, and One Extremely Creepy Argument.Kenneth Einar Himma - 2004 - Faith and Philosophy 21 (2):250-255.
Abortion and referrals for abortion: is the law in need of change?Demian Whiting - 2011 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 17 (5):1006-1008.
The harm of immorality.Paul Bloomfield - 2008 - Ratio 21 (3):241-259.
Abortion, competing entitlements, and parental responsibility.Alex Rajczi - 2009 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (4):379-395.
Reply to Di Nucci: why the counterexamples succeed.C. Strong - 2009 - Journal of Medical Ethics 35 (5):326-327.
Abortion, Christianity, and Consistency.Richard Schoenig - 1998 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 5 (1):32-37.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-04-06

Downloads
95 (#181,194)

6 months
13 (#194,369)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Bruce P. Blackshaw
University of Birmingham