In defense of the received view

Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):863 - 887 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In the paper, I present Christopher Gauker's critique of the view that we talk to each other as a way to make ourselves understood (the received view of linguistic communication) and his alternative theory. I show that both his critique and his alternative fail, and defend the received view of linguistic communication

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,628

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

On a Straw Man in the Philosophy of Science - A Defense of the Received View.Sebastian Lutz - 2012 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 2 (1):77–120.
What’s Wrong with the Received View of Evolutionary Theory?John Beatty - 1980 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980:397 - 426.
Are Virtual Quanta Nothing but Formal Tools?Mario Bacelar Valente - 2011 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (1):39 - 53.
Ecological color.Virgil Whitmyer - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):197-214.
Active Mimesis and the Art of History of Philosophy.Robert Piercey - 2003 - International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):29-42.
What Scientific Theories Could Not Be.Hans Halvorson - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (2):183-206.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-09-20

Downloads
54 (#294,172)

6 months
7 (#419,182)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Steffen Borge
Nord University

Citations of this work

Talking to Infants: A Gricean Perspective.Steffen Borge - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):423.
The Communicative Significance of Beliefs and Desires.Uku Tooming - 2014 - Dissertation, Universitatis Tartunesis
Horwich on Natural and Non-Natural Meaning.Steffen Borge - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (2):229-253.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
An essay concerning human understanding.John Locke - 1689 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Pauline Phemister.
Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind.Paul M. Churchland (ed.) - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

View all 25 references / Add more references