Animalism and the varieties of conjoined twinning

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (4):285-301 (2010)
We defend the view that we are not identical to organisms against the objection that it implies that there are two subjects of every conscious state one experiences: oneself and one’s organism. We then criticize animalism—the view that each of us is identical to a human organism—by showing that it has unacceptable implications for a range of actual and hypothetical cases of conjoined twinning: dicephalus, craniopagus parasiticus, and cephalopagus
Keywords Animalism  Personal identity  Dicephalus  Craniopagus parasiticus  Cephalopagus  Too-many-subjects problem
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DOI 10.1007/s11017-010-9150-0
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References found in this work BETA
Eric T. Olson (2007). What Are We? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):37-55.

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Citations of this work BETA
Eric T. Olson (2015). On Parfit's View That We Are Not Human Beings. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:39-56.
Giovanni Boniolo (2013). Is an Account of Identity Necessary for Bioethics? What Post-Genomic Biomedicine Can Teach Us. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (3):401-411.

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