Animalism and the corpse problem

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):265-74 (2004)
Abstract
The apparent fact that each of us coincides with a thinking animal looks like a strong argument for our being animals (animalism). Some critics, however, claim that this sort of reasoning actually undermines animalism. According to them, the apparent fact that each human animal coincides with a thinking body that is not an animal is an equally strong argument for our not being animals. I argue that the critics' case fails for reasons that do not affect the case for animalism.
Keywords Animalism  Body  Corpse  Metaphysics  Thinking
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    Patrick Toner (2011). Hylemorphic Animalism. Philosophical Studies 155 (1):65 - 81.
    Christopher Belshaw (2010). Animals, Identity and Persistence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):401 - 419.

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