Graduate studies at Western
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):265-74 (2004)
|Abstract||The apparent fact that each of us coincides with a thinking animal looks like a strong argument for our being animals (animalism). Some critics, however, claim that this sort of reasoning actually undermines animalism. According to them, the apparent fact that each human animal coincides with a thinking body that is not an animal is an equally strong argument for our not being animals. I argue that the critics' case fails for reasons that do not affect the case for animalism.|
|Keywords||Animalism Body Corpse Metaphysics Thinking|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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