Animalism and the corpse problem

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):265-74 (2004)
The apparent fact that each of us coincides with a thinking animal looks like a strong argument for our being animals (animalism). Some critics, however, claim that this sort of reasoning actually undermines animalism. According to them, the apparent fact that each human animal coincides with a thinking body that is not an animal is an equally strong argument for our not being animals. I argue that the critics' case fails for reasons that do not affect the case for animalism.
Keywords Animalism  Body  Corpse  Metaphysics  Thinking
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/713659837
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Patrick Toner (2011). Hylemorphic Animalism. Philosophical Studies 155 (1):65 - 81.
Christopher Belshaw (2010). Animals, Identity and Persistence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):401 - 419.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

227 ( #6,879 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

25 ( #36,765 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.