Abstract

One of the most important pillars of epistemic pluralism is pluralism in beliefs. Therefore, we are obliged to discuss about pluralism in beliefs when we talk about epistemic pluralism. It can be claimed that one of the most important aspects of rationality of pluralism in beliefs is the capability of variation in beliefs themselves. It seems that doubt and uncertainty about some beliefs are possibly related to the probability of variation in beliefs. The beliefs that are not certain and we are not sure about them can tolerate other uncertain beliefs. However, the issue should be explained in such a way that it does not lead to anarchy and excessive relativism. We can evaluate beliefs by analyzing them and how variation occurs in them. No doubt, this evaluation should not lead us to absolutism and denial of variation. By analyzing belief, we understand that three main components of belief are believer, subject of belief and statement of belief. Accordingly, we can use theoretical foundations related to each of these components to explain variability in beliefs.