David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 1 (3):263-78 (1988)
Abstract Cognitive Science, it is argued, comprises two distinct projects. One is an Engineering project whose goal is understanding the in?the?head computational activities which ground intelligent behaviour. The other is a Descriptive project whose goal is the mapping of relations between thoughts as ascribed using the (sentential) apparatus of the propositional attitudes. Some theorists (e.g. Fodor, 1987) insist that the two projects are (in a sense to be explained) deeply related. This view is contested, and the consequences of its abandonment examined. Such consequences are seen to include (i) the irrelevance of scientific arguments for Eliminative Materialism, (ii) a view concerning the proper roles of classical and connectionist work in Artificial Intelligence and (iii) the failure of an allegedly damning argument against connectionism (the so?called systematicity argument)
|Keywords||Cognitive Metaphysics Realism Science Type|
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References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
Stephen P. Stich (1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief. MIT Press.
Donald Davidson (1984). Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford University Press.
Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1988). Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture. Cognition 28 (1-2):3-71.
Citations of this work BETA
Brian P. McLaughlin (1993). The Connectionism/Classicism Battle to Win Souls. Philosophical Studies 71 (2):163-190.
Brian P. McLaughlin (1992). Systematicity, Conceptual Truth, and Evolution. Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences 34:217-234.
Grant Gillett (2001). Signification and the Unconscious. Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):477 – 498.
Andy Clark (1989). Beyond Eliminativism. Mind and Language 4 (4):251-79.
Brian P. McLaughlin (1993). Systematicity, Conceptual Truth, and Evolution. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 34:217-234.
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