An externalist solution to the "moral problem"

In his recent book, The Moral Problem , Michael Smith presents a number of arguments designed to expose the difficulties with so-called 'extcrnalist' theories of motivation. This essay endeavors to defend externalism from Smith's attacks. I attempt three tasks in the essay. First, I try to clarify and reformulate Smith's distinction between internalism and externalism. Second, I formulate two of Smith's arguments- what I call the 'reliability argument' and 'the rationalist argument' -and attempt to show that these arguments fail to damage externalism. Third, I undertake to expose and question some of the motivations that drive internalism
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DOI 10.2307/2653676
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Sarah Sawyer (2014). Minds and Morals. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):393-408.
Andy Egan (2012). Relativist Dispositional Theories of Value. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):557-582.
Christian Miller (2008). Motivational Internalism. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):233 - 255.

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