Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):359-380 (1999)
|Abstract||In his recent book, The Moral Problem (Basil Blackwell, 1994), Michael Smith presents a number of arguments designed to expose the difficulties with so-called 'externalist' theories of motivation. This essay endeavors to defend externalism from Smith's attacks. I attempt three tasks in the essay. First, I try to clarify and reformulate Smith's distinction between internalism and externalism. Second, I formulate two of Smith's arguments---what I call the 'reliability argument' and 'the rationalist argument'---and attempt to show that these arguments fail to damage externalism. Third, I undertake to expose and question some of the motivations that drive internalism.|
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