How to Individuate Universals—Or Not

Axiomathes 23 (3):551-566 (2013)
Abstract
In a recent article in this journal, J. P. Moreland (2013) extends his theory of individuation to include universals. In this note, I show how Moreland’s novel proposal leads to the unwanted conclusion that every concrete particular exists of necessity and has but a single essential property
Keywords Universals  Individuation  Mereological wholes  Bare particulars
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.
Andrew M. Bailey (2012). No Bare Particulars. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):31-41.

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