David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):316 - 338 (2006)
The best grounds for accepting contextualism concerning knowledge attributions are to be found in how knowledge-attributing (and knowledge-denying) sentences are used in ordinary, nonphilosophical talk: What ordinary speakers will count as “knowledge” in some non-philosophical contexts they will deny is such in others. Contextualists typically appeal to pairs of cases that forcefully display the variability in the epistemic standards that govern ordinary usage: A “low standards” case (henceforth, “LOW”) in which a speaker seems quite appropriately and truthfully to ascribe knowledge to a subject will be paired with a “high standards” case (“HIGH”) in which another speaker in a quite different and more demanding context seems with equal propriety and truth to say that the same subject (or a similarly positioned subject) does not know. The contextualist argument based on such cases is driven by the premises that the positive attribution of knowledge in LOW is true, and that the denial of knowledge in HIGH is true. And where the contextualist has constructed HIGH and LOW wisely, those premises are in turn powerfully supported by the two mutually reinforcing strands of evidence that both of the claims intuitively seem true, and that both claims are perfectly appropriate. The resulting argument for contextualism is very powerful indeed, but I am on the offensive making that case in another paper: “The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism and the New Invariantism.”.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Carl Baker (2012). Indexical Contextualism and the Challenges From Disagreement. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):107-123.
Daniel Z. Korman (2013). Fundamental Quantification and the Language of the Ontology Room. Noûs 49 (1):n/a-n/a.
N. Ángel Pinillos (2011). Some Recent Work in Experimental Epistemology. Philosophy Compass 6 (10):675-688.
Dylan Dodd (2010). Confusion About Concessive Knowledge Attributions. Synthese 172 (3):381 - 396.
Dirk Kindermann (2013). Relativism, Sceptical Paradox, and Semantic Blindness. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):585-603.
Similar books and articles
Jason Stanley (2004). On the Linguistic Basis for Contextualism. Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):119-146.
Mylan Engel (2004). What's Wrong with Contextualism, and a Noncontextualist Resolution of the Skeptical Paradox. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):203-231.
Mylan Engel Jr (2004). What's Wrong with Contextualism, and a Noncontextualist Resolution of the Skeptical Paradox. Erkenntnis 61 (2/3):203 - 231.
Keith DeRose (2005). The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism, and the New Invariantism. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):172–198.
Wayne A. Davis (2005). Contextualist Theories of Knowledge. Acta Analytica 20 (1):29-42.
Elke Brendel (2005). Why Contextualists Cannot Know They Are Right: Self-Refuting Implications of Contextualism. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 20 (2):38-55.
Keith DeRose (2004). The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):346–350.
Wayne A. Davis (2004). Are Knowledge Claims Indexical? Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):257 - 281.
Jim Stone (2007). Contextualism and Warranted Assertion. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):92–113.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads184 ( #4,331 of 1,413,490 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #94,935 of 1,413,490 )
How can I increase my downloads?