Intuitions, counter-examples, and experimental philosophy

Abstract
Practitioners of the new ‘experimental philosophy’ have collected data that appear to show that some philosophical intuitions are culturally variable. Many experimental philosophers take this to pose a problem for a more traditional, ‘armchair’ style of philosophizing. It is argued that this is a mistake that derives from a false assumption about the character of philosophical methods; neither philosophy nor its methods have anything to fear from cultural variability in philosophical intuitions.
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References found in this work BETA
Mylan Engel (1992). Is Epistemic Luck Compatible with Knowledge? Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):59-75.
Alvin I. Goldman (1967). A Causal Theory of Knowing. Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.

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