From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis

New York: Oxford University Press (1998)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Frank Jackson champions the cause of conceptual analysis as central to philosophical inquiry. In recent years conceptual analysis has been undervalued and widely misunderstood, suggests Jackson. He argues that such analysis is mistakenly clouded in mystery, preventing a whole range of important questions from being productively addressed. He anchors his argument in discussions of specific philosophical issues, starting with the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism and moving on, via free will, meaning, personal identity, motion, and change, to ethics and the philosophy of color. In this way the book not only offers a methodological program for philosophy, but also casts new light on some much-debated problems and their interrelations

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,897

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Concepts and conceptual analysis.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):253-282.
Deducing the mind.Andrew Gleeson - 1999 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 42 (3-4):385-410.
Conceptual analysis for representationalists.Frank Jackson - 2010 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 81 (1):173-188.
Has psychology debunked conceptual analysis?Per Sandin - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 37 (1):26–33.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
955 (#14,591)

6 months
48 (#89,689)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Frank Jackson
Australian National University

Citations of this work

Mental Files.François Récanati - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Josep Macia (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications. Oxford University Press. pp. 55-140.
Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):153-226.
Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

View all 982 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.

View all 142 references / Add more references