Wishful Intelligibility, Black Boxes, and Epidemiological Explanation

Philosophy of Science 88 (5):824-834 (2021)
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Abstract

Epidemiological explanation often has a “black box” character, meaning the intermediate steps between cause and effect are unknown. Filling in black boxes is thought to improve causal inferences by making them intelligible. I argue that adding information about intermediate causes to a black box explanation is an unreliable guide to pragmatic intelligibility because it may mislead us about the stability of a cause. I diagnose a problem that I call wishful intelligibility, which occurs when scientists misjudge the limitations of certain features of an explanation. Wishful intelligibility gives us a new reason to prefer black box explanations in some contexts.

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Marina DiMarco
University of Pittsburgh

Citations of this work

Going big by going small: Trade-offs in microbiome explanations of cancer.Emily C. Parke & Anya Plutynski - 2023 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 97 (C):101-110.
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References found in this work

Thinking about mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
Inductive risk and values in science.Heather Douglas - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.
True enough.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):113–131.
Interpreting causality in the health sciences.Federica Russo & Jon Williamson - 2007 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (2):157 – 170.

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