David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 173 (1):53 - 73 (2010)
This paper presents a generalized form of Fitch's paradox of knowability, with the aim of showing that the questions it raises are not peculiar to the topics of knowledge, belief, or other epistemic notions. Drawing lessons from the generalization, the paper offers a solution to Fitch's paradox that exploits an understanding of modal talk about what could be known in terms of capacities to know. It is argued that, in rare cases, one might have the capacity to know that p even if it is metaphysically impossible for anyone to know that p, and that recognizing this fact provides the resources to solve Fitch's paradox
|Keywords||Knowability Capacities Fitch’s paradox|
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References found in this work BETA
Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
David Hume (2009/2004). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), The Monist. Oxford University Press 112.
Robert Stalnaker (2002). Common Ground. Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):701-721.
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Citations of this work BETA
André Fuhrmann (2014). Knowability as Potential Knowledge. Synthese 191 (7):1627-1648.
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