The mind argument and libertarianism

Mind 107 (427):515-28 (1998)
Abstract
Many critics of libertarian freedom have charged that freedom is incompatible with indeterminism. We show that the strongest argument that has been provided for this claim is invalid. The invalidity of the argument in question, however, implies the invalidity of the standard Consequence argument for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism. We show how to repair the Consequence argument and argue that no similar improvement will revive the worry about the compatibility of indeterminism and freedom.
Keywords Consequentialism  Freedom  Libertarianism  Metaphysics  Mind
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,273
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Seth Shabo (2011). Why Free Will Remains a Mystery. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):105-125.
Michael C. Rea (2006). Presentism and Fatalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):511 – 524.

View all 14 citations

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

124 ( #6,816 of 1,096,280 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #26,118 of 1,096,280 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.