Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis
In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer (2009)
| Abstract | What propositions are rational for one to believe? With what confidence is it rational for one to believe these propositions? Answering the first of these questions requires an epistemology of beliefs, answering the second an epistemology of degrees of belief. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,865 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
David J. Owens (2003). Does Belief Have an Aim? Philosophical Studies 115 (3):283-305.
Richard Swinburne (2001). Swinburne and Plantinga on Internal Rationality. Religious Studies 37 (3):357-358.
Alvin Plantinga (2001). Swinburne and Plantinga on Internal Rationality. Religious Studies 37 (3):357-358.
Jake Chandler (2009). Review of Franz Huber and Christoph Schmidt-Petri, Eds. Degrees of Belief. Philosophy in Review 296:422-424.
Brad Armendt (2010). Stakes and Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 147 (1).
Ralph Wedgwood (2011). Primitively Rational Belief-Forming Processes. In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
Franz Huber (2009). Belief and Degrees of Belief. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.
Jane Friedman (forthcoming). Rational Agnosticism and Degrees of Belief. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 4.
James Hawthorne & Luc Bovens (1999). The Preface, the Lottery, and the Logic of Belief. Mind 108 (430):241-264.
James Hawthorne (2009). The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese Library: Springer.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-02-01Total downloads152 ( #2,560 of 556,807 )Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #7,578 of 556,807 )How can I increase my downloads? |

