Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis

In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer. 37-47 (2009)
Abstract
What propositions are rational for one to believe? With what confidence is it rational for one to believe these propositions? Answering the first of these questions requires an epistemology of beliefs, answering the second an epistemology of degrees of belief.
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Citations of this work BETA
Ralph Wedgwood (2012). Outright Belief. Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.
Baron Reed (2012). Fallibilism. Philosophy Compass 7 (9):585-596.
Bruno Whittle (2012). Belief, Information and Reasoning. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):431-446.

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