Response to de Bruin and Gallagher: embodied simulation as reuse is a productive explanation of a basic form of mind-reading

Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (2):99-100 (2012)
Abstract
de Bruin & Gallagher (2012) suggest that the view of embodied simulation (ES) put forward in our recent article (Gallese and Sinigaglia 2011) lacks explanatory power. We argue that the notion of reuse of mental states represented with a bodily format provides a convincing simulational account of the mirroring mechanism (MM) and its role in mind-reading.
Keywords Embodied Simulation  Mirror Mechanism  Mindreading
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    References found in this work BETA
    Susan Hurley (2008). Understanding Simulation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):755-774.
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