Moral Dilemmas

Oxford Uiversity Press (1987)
Abstract
The essays in this volume illuminate a central topic in ethical theory: moral dilemmas. Some contemporary philosophers dispute the traditional view that a true moral dilemma -- a situation in which a person has two irreconcilable moral duties -- cannot exist. This collection provides the historical background to the ongoing debate with selections from Kant, Mill, Bradley, and Ross. The best recent work on the question is represented in essays by Donagan, Foot, Hare, Marcus, Nagel, van Fraassen, Williams, and others
Keywords Ethics  Dilemma
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book $3.64 used (94% off)   $21.65 new (62% off)   $56.00 direct from Amazon    Amazon page
Call number BJ1012.M6315 1987
ISBN(s) 0195042719   9780195042719  
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 20,491
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
Chapters BETA
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Bart Streumer (2007). Reasons and Impossibility. Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.
John R. Welch (2011). Decision Theory and Cognitive Choice. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):147-172.

View all 26 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

60 ( #70,584 of 1,902,070 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #281,246 of 1,902,070 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.