Updating as Communication

Traditional procedures for rational updating fail when it comes to self-locating opinions, such as your credences about where you are and what time it is. This paper develops an updating procedure for rational agents with self-locating beliefs. In short, I argue that rational updating can be factored into two steps. The first step uses information you recall from your previous self to form a hypothetical credence distribution, and the second step changes this hypothetical distribution to reflect information you have genuinely learned as time has passed. While the second step resembles traditional procedures of updating by conditionalization, the first is best understood by analogy to traditional models of how agents transmit self-locating opinions through ordinary interpersonal communication.
Keywords Sleeping Beauty  updating  self-locating  Frege's Puzzle
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00572.x
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References found in this work BETA
Seth Yalcin (2007). Epistemic Modals. Mind 116 (464):983-1026.

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Citations of this work BETA
Max Kölbel (2015). Relativism 2: Semantic Content. Philosophy Compass 10 (1):52–67.
Clas Weber (2013). Centered Communication. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):205-223.

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