David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248 (2012)
Traditional procedures for rational updating fail when it comes to self-locating opinions, such as your credences about where you are and what time it is. This paper develops an updating procedure for rational agents with self-locating beliefs. In short, I argue that rational updating can be factored into two steps. The first step uses information you recall from your previous self to form a hypothetical credence distribution, and the second step changes this hypothetical distribution to reflect information you have genuinely learned as time has passed. While the second step resembles traditional procedures of updating by conditionalization, the first is best understood by analogy to traditional models of how agents transmit self-locating opinions through ordinary interpersonal communication.
|Keywords||Sleeping Beauty updating self-locating Frege's Puzzle|
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Citations of this work BETA
Clas Weber (2013). Centered Communication. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):205-223.
Michael G. Titelbaum (2013). Ten Reasons to Care About the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1003-1017.
Meghan Sullivan (2014). Change We Can Believe In (and Assert). Noûs 48 (3):474-495.
Max Kölbel (2013). The Conversational Role of Centered Contents. Inquiry 56 (2-3):97-121.
Dilip Ninan (2013). Self‐Location and Other‐Location. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):301-331.
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