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  1. Elisa Aaltola (2007). The Moral Value of Animals. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 3:219-225.
    Altruism has often been thought to be the reason we treat animals with a certain moral respect. Animals are not moral agents who could reciprocally honour our well being, and because of this duties toward them are considered to be based on other-directed motivations. Altruism is a vague notion, and in the context of animals can be divided into at least three different alternatives. The first one equates altruism with benevolence or "kindness"; the second one argues altruism is based on (...)
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  2. Christel Fricke (ed.) (2011). The Ethics of Forgiveness: A Collection of Essays. Routledge.
    We are often pressed to forgive or in need of forgiveness: Wrongdoing is common. Even after a perpetrator has been taken to court and punished, forgiveness still has a role to play. How should a victim and a perpetrator relate to each other outside the courtroom, and how should others relate to them? Communicating about forgiveness is particularly urgent in cases of civil war and crimes against humanity inside a community where, if there were no forgiveness, the community would fall (...)
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  3. Elizabeth V. Spelman (2008). Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations After Wrongdoingby Margaret Urban Walker. Hypatia 23 (4):228-233.
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  4. Elizabeth V. Spelman (2008). Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations After Wrongdoing (Review). Hypatia 23 (4):pp. 228-233.
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  5. Elise Springer (2013). Communicating Moral Concern: An Ethics of Critical Responsiveness. The Mit Press.
    Examines the social aspect of moral agency, building an account of critical engagement that focuses on the transformation of moral attention through communicative exchange, rather than on matters of judgment or on behavioral outcomes.
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  6. Julia Tanner (2002). Value, Respect and Attachment (Book Review). [REVIEW] Philosophical Writings (21).
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  7. Michael J. Zimmerman (1999). The Moral Aspect of Nonmoral Goods and Evils. Utilitas 11 (01):1-15.
    The idea that immoral behaviour can sometimes be admirable, and that moral behaviour can sometimes be less than admirable, has led several of its supporters to infer that moral considerations are not always overriding, contrary to what has been traditionally maintained. In this paper I shall challenge this inference. My purpose in doing so is to expose and acknowledge something that has been inadequately appreciated, namely, the moral aspect of nonmoral goods and evils. I hope thereby to show that, even (...)
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Desert
  1. Linda F. Annis (1986). Merit Pay, Utilitarianism, and Desert. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 3 (1):33-41.
  2. Gustaf Arrhenius (2003). Feldman's Desert-Adjusted Utilitarianism and Population Ethics. Utilitas 15 (02):225-.
    Fred Feldman has proposed a desert-adjusted version of utilitarianism, , as a plausible population axiology. Among other things, he claims that justicism avoids Derek Parfit's . This paper explains the theory and tries to straighten out some of its ambiguities. Moreover, it is shown that it is not clear whether justicism avoids the repugnant conclusion and that it is has other counter-intuitive implications. It is concluded that justicism is not convincing as a population axiology.
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  3. Ronen Avraham & Daniel Statman (2013). More on the Comparative Nature of Desert: Can a Deserved Punishment Be Unjust? Utilitas 25 (3):316-333.
    Adam and Eve have the same record yet receive different punishments. Adam receives the punishment that they both deserve, whereas Eve receives a more lenient punishment. In this article, we explore whether a deserved-but-unequal punishment, such as what Adam receives, can be just. We do this by explicating the conceptions of retributive justice that underlie both sides of the debate. We argue that inequality in punishment is disturbing mainly because of the disrespect it often expresses towards the offender receiving the (...)
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  4. Sorin Baiasu (2007). Institutions and the Normativity of Desert. Contemporary Political Theory 6 (2):175.
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  5. Brenda M. Baker (1997). Improving Our Practice of Sentencing. Utilitas 9 (01):99-.
    Restorative justice should have greater weight as a criterion in criminal justice sentencing practice. It permits a realistic recognition of the kinds of harm and damage caused by offences, and encourages individualized non-custodial sentencing options as ways of addressing these harms. Non-custodial sentences have proven more effective than incarceration in securing social reconciliation and preventing recidivism, and they avoid the serious social and personal costs of imprisonment. This paper argues in support of restorative justice as a guiding idea in sentencing. (...)
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  6. Lene Bomann-Larsen (2009). Revisionism and Desert. Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (1):1-16.
    Revisionists claim that the retributive intuitions informing our responsibility-attributing practices are unwarranted under determinism, not only because they are false, but because if we are all victims of causal luck , it is unfair to treat one another as if we are deserving of moral and legal sanctions. One (moderate) revisionist strategy recommends a deflationary concept of moral responsibility, and that we justify punishment in consequentialist rather than retributive terms. Another (strong) revisionist strategy recommends that we eliminate all concepts of (...)
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  7. Kimberley Brownlee (2006). Serena Olsaretti (Ed.), Desert and Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Pp. Xi + 269. Utilitas 18 (04):449-.
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  8. Erik Carlson (1997). Consequentialism, Distribution and Desert. Utilitas 9 (03):307-.
    This paper criticizes the consequentialist theory recently put forward by Fred Feldman. I argue that this theory violates two crucial requirements. Another theory, proposed by Peter Vallentyne, is similarly flawed. Feldman's basic ideas could, however, be developed into a more plausible theory. I suggest one possible way of doing this.
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  9. Peter Celello (2009). Against Desert as a Forward-Looking Concept. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (2):144-159.
    Fred Feldman and, more recently, David Schmidtz have challenged the standard view that a person's desert is based strictly on past and present facts about him. I argue that Feldman's attempt to overturn this 'received wisdom' about desert's temporal orientation is unsuccessful, since his examples do not establish that what a person deserves now can be based on what will occur in the future. In addition, his forward-looking account introduces an unnecessary asymmetry regarding desert's temporal orientation in different contexts. Schmidtz (...)
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  10. Randolph Clarke (2013). Some Theses on Desert. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):153-64.
    Consider the idea that suffering of some specific kind is deserved by those who are guilty of moral wrongdoing. Feeling guilty is a prime example. It might be said that it is noninstrumentally good that one who is guilty feel guilty (at the right time and to the right degree), or that feeling guilty (at the right time and to the right degree) is apt or fitting for one who is guilty. Each of these claims constitutes an interesting thesis about (...)
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  11. I. Introductory Comment (1995). Justice, Desert, and the Repugnant Conclusion. Utilitas 7 (2).
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  12. S. Consensus (1995). Justice, Desert, and the Repugnant Conclusion. Utilitas 7 (2).
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  13. Anthony Ellis (1997). Punishment and the Principle of Fair Play. Utilitas 9 (01):81-.
    What I call the Just Distribution theory of punishment holds that the justification of punishment is that it rectifies the social distribution of benefits and burdens which has been upset by the offender. I argue that a recent version of this theory is no more viable than earlier versions. Like them, it fails in its avowed intention to deliver fundamental intuitions about crime and punishment. The root problem is its foundation in Hart's Principle of Fair Play, a foundation which, I (...)
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  14. Fred Feldman (1996). Responsibility as a Condition for Desert. Mind 105 (417):165-168.
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  15. Fred Feldman (1995). Desert: Reconsideration of Some Received Wisdom. Mind 104 (413):63-77.
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  16. Robert L. Frazier (2000). Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert. Dialogue 39 (3):626-627.
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  17. Jake Greenblum (2010). Distributive and Retributive Desert in Rawls. Journal of Social Philosophy 41 (2):169-184.
    In this paper I examine John Rawls’s understanding of desert. Against Samuel Scheffler, I maintain that the reasons underlying Rawls’s rejection of the traditional view of distributive desert in A Theory of Justice also commit him to rejecting the traditional view of retributive desert. Unlike Rawls’s critics, however, I view this commitment in a positive light. I also argue that Rawls’s later work commits him to rejecting retributivism as a public justification for punishment.
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  18. Nathan Hanna (2013). Two Claims About Desert. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):41-56.
    Many philosophers claim that it is always intrinsically good when people get what they deserve and that there is always at least some reason to give people what they deserve. I highlight problems with this view and defend an alternative. I have two aims. First, I want to expose a gap in certain desert-based justifications of punishment. Second, I want to show that those of us who have intuitions at odds with these justifications have an alternative account of desert at (...)
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  19. Robert Johnson, Merit.
    A few pages into the Groundwork Kant claims that only actions from duty have moral worth.ii Even though as an aside he also says that a dutiful action from sympathy or honor, though lacking in moral worth, "deserves praise and encouragement", it is tempting not to take him very seriously. One suspects that he regards this praise as only a poor and morally insignificant cousin of the esteem reserved for actions from duty. In the end, it seems hard to avoid (...)
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  20. Stephen Kershnar (2008). Desert Tracks Character Alone. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (1):71-88.
    In this paper, I argue that character alone grounds desert. I begin by arguing that desert is grounded by a person’s character, action, or both. In the second section, I defend the claim that character grounds desert. My argument rests on intuitions that other things being equal, it would be intrinsically better for virtuous persons to flourish and vicious persons suffer than vice versa. In the third section, I argue that actions do not ground desert. I give three arguments in (...)
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  21. Matt King (2014). Two Faces of Desert. Philosophical Studies 169 (3):401-424.
    There are two broadly competing pictures of moral responsibility. On the view I favor, to be responsible for some action is to be related to it in such a way that licenses attributing certain properties to the agent, properties like blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. Responsibility is attributability. A different view understands being responsible in terms of our practices of holding each other responsible. Responsibility is accountability, which “involves a social setting in which we demand (require) certain conduct from one another and (...)
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  22. Matt King (2012). Moral Responsibility and Merit. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2).
    In the contemporary moral responsibility debate, most theorists seem to be giving accounts of responsibility in the ‘desert-entailing sense’. Despite this agreement, little has been said about the notion of desert that is supposedly entailed. In this paper I propose an understanding of desert sufficient to help explain why the blameworthy and praiseworthy deserve blame and praise, respectively. I do so by drawing upon what might seem an unusual resource. I appeal to so-called Fitting-Attitude accounts of value to help inform (...)
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  23. Matt Matravers (1999). Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993, Pp. Xviii + 111. Utilitas 11 (02):246-.
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  24. Owen McLeod (1996). Desert and Wages. Utilitas 8 (2):205-221.
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  25. Phillip Montague (2009). Revisiting the Censure Theory of Punishment. Philosophia 37 (1):125-131.
    This paper is a rejoinder to Thaddeus Metz’s article “Censure Theory Still Best Accounts for Punishment of the Guilty: Reply to Montague.” In his article, Metz attempts to answer objections to censure theory that I had raised previously. I argue in my rejoinder that Metz’s defense of censure theory remains seriously problematic despite what he says in his reply.
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  26. Eric Moore (2000). Desert, Virtue, and Justice. Social Theory and Practice 26 (3):417-442.
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  27. Jeffrie G. Murphy (2012). Punishment and the Moral Emotions: Essays in Law, Morality, and Religion. OUP USA.
    This collection of essays presents Jeffrie G. Murphy's most recent ideas on punishment, forgiveness, and the emotions of resentment, shame, guilt, remorse, love, and jealousy. In Murphy's view, conscious rationales of principle -- such as crime control or giving others what in justice they deserve -- do not always drive our decisions to punish or condemn others for wrongdoing. Sometimes our decisions are in fact driven by powerful and rather base emotions such as malice, spite, envy, and cruelty. But our (...)
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  28. Mark S. Nattrass (1993). Devlin, Hart, and the Proper Limits of Legal Coercion. Utilitas 5 (01):91-.
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  29. Serena Olsaretti (2002). Unmasking Equality? Kagan on Equality and Desert. Utilitas 14 (03):387-.
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  30. Ingmar Persson (1997). Ambiguities in Feldman's Desert-Adjusted Values. Utilitas 9 (03):319-.
    Fred Feldman has argued that consequentialists can answer the well-known by replacing the utilitarian axiology with one that makes the value of receiving pleasures and pains depend on how deserved it is. It is shown that this proposal is open to three interpretations: (1) the Fit-idea, which operates with the degree of fit between what recipients get and what they deserve; (2) the Merit-idea, which operates with the magnitude of the recipients' desert or merit; and (3) the Fit-Merit idea which (...)
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  31. Glen Pettigrove (2007). Hume on Forgiveness and the Unforgivable. Utilitas 19 (4):447-465.
    Are torture and torturers unforgivable? The article examines this question in the light of a Humean account of forgiveness. Initially, the Humean account appears to suggest that torturers are unforgivable. However, in the end, I argue it provides us with good reasons to think that even torturers may be forgiven.
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  32. Philip Pettit (1997). Republican Theory and Criminal Punishment. Utilitas 9 (01):59-.
    Suppose we embrace the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination: freedom as immunity to arbitrary interference. In that case those acts that call uncontroversially for criminalization will usually be objectionable on three grounds: the offender assumes a dominating position in relation to the victim, the offender reduces the range or ease of undominated choice on the part of the victim, and the offender raises a spectre of domination for others like the victim. And in that case, so it appears, the (...)
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  33. John P. Pittman (1997). Punishment and Race. Utilitas 9 (01):115-.
    This article criticizes the standard way philosophers pose issues about the core practices of criminal justice institutions. Attempting to get at some of the presuppositions of posing these issues in terms of punishment, I construct a revised version of Rawls's case, a revision based on actual features of contemporary criminal justice practices in the USA. In addressing the implications of , as I call it, some connections are made to current philosophical discussions about race. I conclude with brief remarks about (...)
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  34. Igor Primorac (1982). Utilitarianism and Punishment. International Philosophical Quarterly 22 (4):241-254.
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  35. Theron Pummer (2014). Does Division Multiply Desert? Philosophical Review 123 (1):43-77.
    It seems plausible that (i) how much punishment a person deserves cannot be affected by the mere existence or nonexistence of another person. We might have also thought that (ii) how much punishment is deserved cannot increase merely in virtue of personal division. I argue that (i) and (ii) are inconsistent with the popular belief that, other things being equal, when people culpably do very wrong or bad acts, they ought to be punished for this—even if they have repented, are (...)
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  36. Lubomira Radoilska (2010). An Aristotelian Approach to Cognitive Enhancement. Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (3):365–375.
    In this paper, I argue that cognitive enhancement cannot be epistemically beneficial since getting things right in particular and epistemic agency in general both presuppose a kind of achievement. Drawing on Aristotle’s ethics, I distinguish four categories of actions: caused, attributable, responsible, and creditable. I conclude that to the extent that cognitive enhancement is incompatible with the latter category it undermines rather than strengthens autonomous agency in the realm of cognition.
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  37. Marc Ramsay (2005). Teleological Egalitarianism Vs. The Slogan. Utilitas 17 (1):93-116.
    The Slogan holds that one situation cannot be worse (or better) than another unless there is someone for whom it is worse (or better). This principle appears to provide the basis for the levelling-down objection to teleological egalitarianism. Larry Temkin, however, argues that the Slogan is not a plausible moral ideal, since it stands against not just teleological egalitarianism, but also values such as freedom, rights, autonomy, virtue and desert. I argue that the Slogan is a plausible moral principle, one (...)
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  38. Matthew Rendall (2013). Priority and Desert. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):939-951.
    Michael Otsuka, Alex Voorhoeve and Marc Fleurbaey have challenged the priority view in favour of a theory based on competing claims. The present paper shows how their argument can be used to recast the priority view. All desert claims in distributive justice are comparative. The stronger a party’s claims to a given benefit, the greater is the value of her receiving it. Ceteris paribus, the worse-off have stronger claims on welfare, and benefits to them matter more. This can account for (...)
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  39. Brian Rosebury (2009). Private Revenge and its Relation to Punishment. Utilitas 21 (1):1-21.
    In contrast to the vast literature on retributive theories of punishment, discussions of private revenge are rare in moral philosophy. This paper reviews some examples, from both classical and recent writers, finding uncertainty and equivocation over the ethical significance of acts of revenge, and in particular over their possible resemblances, in motive, purpose or justification, to acts of lawful punishment. A key problem for the coherence of our ethical conception of revenge is the consideration that certain acts of revenge may (...)
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  40. Jesper Ryberg (2013). Retributivism and Resources. Utilitas 25 (1):66-79.
    A traditional overall distinction between the various versions of retributive theories of punishment is that between positive and negative retributivism. This article addresses the question of what positive retributivism implies for a society in which the state has many other types of obligation (e.g. obligations to provide its citizens with some degree of health care, education, protection, etc.). Several approaches to this question are considered. It is argued that the resource priority question constitutes a genuine and widely ignored challenge for (...)
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  41. Frederick Schauer (2011). Bentham on Presumed Offences. Utilitas 23 (04):363-379.
    In the Principles of the Penal Code, Jeremy Bentham described offences that he labelled presumed or evidentiary. The conduct penalized under such offences is punished not because it is intrinsically wrong, but because it probabilistically indicates the presence of an intrinsic wrong. Bentham was sceptical of the need to create offences, but grudgingly accepted their value in light of deficiencies in procedure and the judiciary. These days the scepticism is even greater, with courts and commentators in the United States, Canada, (...)
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  42. David Schmidtz (2002). How to Deserve. Political Theory 30 (6):774-799.
    People ought to get what they deserve. And what we deserve can depend on effort, performance, or on excelling in competition, even when excellence is partly a function of our natural gifts. Or so most people believe. Philosophers sometimes say otherwise. At least since Karl Marx complained about capitalist society extracting surplus value from workers, thereby failing to give workers what they deserve, classical liberal philosophers have worried that to treat justice as a matter of what people deserve is to (...)
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  43. Janet Semple (1992). David Garland, Punishment in Modern Society, A Study in Social Theory, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, Pp. 312. Utilitas 4 (02):338-.
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