Online research in philosophy

The allegedly alternative theories of Phyletic Gradualism and Punctuated Equilibria are examined as regards the nature of their differences. The explanatory value of both models is determined by establishing their actual connection with reality. It is concluded that they are to be considered complementary rather than mutually exclusive at all levels of infraspecific, specific, and supraspecific evolution. So, in order to be described comprehensively, the pathways of evolution require at least two distinct models, each based on a discrete range of real phenomena. [Phyletic Gradualism; Punctuated Equilibria; evolutionary theories; divergence models; additive speciation; microevolution; macroevolution; anagenesis.].

The present article distinguishes three kinds of accounts of direct (reflective) awareness (i.e. awareness of one's mental occurrences causally unmediated by any other mental occurrence): mental-eye theory, self-intimational theory and appendage theory. These aim to explain the same phenomenon, though each proposes that direct (reflective) awareness occurs in a fundamentally different way. Also, I address a crucial problem that appendage theory must solve: how does a direct (reflective) awareness succeed in being awareness specifically of the particular mental-occurrence instance that is its object? Appendage theory is singled out for this attention because psychologists, as they embark on their renewed study of consciousness, are most likely to be attracted by appendage theory for their explanation of direct (reflective) awareness.

We argue that knowledge can be more or less reflective, and distinguish between the instinctive and the reflective knowledge. There is a Wittgensteinian family resemblance relation between them. We argue that the instinctive knowledge is possible without the reflective knowledge, and vice versa.

A common criticism of punctuated equilibria as an evolutionary theory is that it erects a straw man by characterizing the modern synthesis as being devoid of mechanisms that bring about rapid speciation and abrupt changes in morphology. Thompson supports this view and argues that the modern synthesis does not entail gradualism, all-pervasive adaptationism, or extrapolationism and that punctuationists have mischaracterized the theory on all these points; properly understood the synthetic theory is hierarchical and able to explain phenomena at all levels of the hierarchy, thus rendering macroevolutionary theories, such as punctuated equilibria, unnecessary. I argue in this paper that Thompson's approach is overly dependent upon rational reconstruction in the style of the logical empiricists, and as such ignores important sociological and historical factors that when taken into account justify punctuational criticism of the synthetic theory.

Imagine two people share a secret which would hurt them each $1000 worth if it got out. You offer to pay them each $1 to (verifiably) tell you their secret. If this is a one-shot simultaneous game, there are two pure-strategy equilibria: one where they both tell and another where neither of them tell. But since the no-tell equilibria makes them both better off, your chances aren’t good.

Pre‐play signals that cost nothing are sometimes thought to be of no significance in interactions which are not games of pure common interest. We investigate the effect of pre‐play signals in an evolutionary setting for Assurance, or Stag Hunt, games and for a Bargaining game. The evolutionary game with signals is found to have dramatically different dynamics from the same game without signals. Signals change stability properties of equilibria in the base game, create new polymorphic equilibria, and change the basins of attraction of equilibria in the base game. Signals carry information at equilibrium in the case of the new polymorphic equilibria, but transient information is the basis for large changes in the magnitude of basins of attraction of equilibria in the base game. These phenomena exemplify new and important differences between evolutionary game theory and game theory based on rational choice.

This paper identifies four major forms of scholarship in bioethics: empirical research, the articulation of mid-level principles of bioethics, the relating of these principles to fundamental moral theories, and discussions of the bioethical implications of legal principles and health delivery policies. It develops a reflective equilibrium approach to the relation between these four forms of scholarship. It then presents, in light of this approach, criteria for quality research in each of these forms of scholarship in bioethics. Keywords: quality of scholarship, reflective equilibria in bioethics, research in bioethics CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?

Humans have two kinds of beliefs, intuitive beliefs and reflective beliefs. Intuitive beliefs are a most fundamental category of cognition, defined in the architecture of the mind. They are formulated in an intuitive mental lexicon. Humans are also capable of entertaining an indefinite variety of higher-order or "reflective" propositional attitudes, many of which are of a credal sort. Reasons to hold "reflective beliefs" are provided by other beliefs that describe the source of the reflective belief as reliable, or that provide explicit arguments in favour of the reflective belief. The mental lexicon of reflective beliefs includes not only intuitive, but also reflective concepts.

We prove existence of mixed strategy equilibria for a class of discontinuous two-player games with non-compact strategy sets. As a corollary of our main results, we obtain a continuum of mixed strategy equilibria for the first- and second-price two-bidder auctions with toeholds. We also find Klemperer’s (2000) result about the existence of mixed strategy equilibria in the classical Bertrand duopoly.

Suppose that one is at least a minimal realist about a given domain, in that one thinks that that domain contains truths that are not in any interesting sense of our own making. Given such an understanding, what can be said for and against the method of reflective equilibrium as a procedure for investigating the domain? One fact that lends this question some interest is that many philosophers do combine commitments to minimal realism and a reflective equilibrium methodology. Here, for example, is David Lewis on philosophy: Our “intuitions” are simply opinions: our philosophical theories are the same. Some are commonsensical, some are sophisticated; some are particular; some general; some are more firmly held, some less. But they are all opinions, and a reasonable goal for a philosopher is to bring them into equilibrium. Our common task it to find out what equilibria there are that can withstand examination, but it remains for each of us to come to rest at one or another of them… Once the menu of well-worked out theories is before us, philosophy is a matter of opinion. Is that to say that there is no truth to be had? Or that the truth is of our own making, and different ones of us can make it differently? Not at all! If you say flatly that there is no god, and I say that there are countless gods but none of them are our worldmates, then it may be that neither of us is making any mistake of method. We may each be bringing our opinions to equilibrium in the most careful possible way, taking account of all the arguments, distinctions, and counterexamples. But one of us, at least, is making a mistake of fact. Which one is wrong depends on what there is (1983: x-xi). In addition to philosophy in general, the method of reflective equilibrium has also been endorsed as the appropriate procedure for investigating various other subject..