133 found
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  1.  6
    Thomas Natsoulas (1993). What is Wrong with the Appendage Theory of Consciousness? Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):137-54.
    The present article distinguishes three kinds of accounts of direct awareness : mental-eye theory, self-intimational theory and appendage theory. These aim to explain the same phenomenon, though each proposes that direct awareness occurs in a fundamentally different way. Also, I address a crucial problem that appendage theory must solve: how does a direct awareness succeed in being awareness specifically of the particular mental-occurrence instance that is its object? Appendage theory is singled out for this attention because psychologists, as they embark (...)
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  2.  30
    Thomas Natsoulas (1983). Perhaps the Most Difficult Problem Faced by Behaviorism. Behaviorism 11 (April):1-26.
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  3.  5
    Thomas Natsoulas (1977). Your Use of the JSTOR Archive Indicates Your Acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, Available At. Behaviorism 5 (1):75-97.
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  4.  3
    Thomas Natsoulas (1978). Haugeland's First Hurdle. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (2):243.
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  5.  1
    Thomas Natsoulas (1977). On Perceptual Aboutness. Behaviorism 5 (1):75-97.
  6.  3
    Thomas Natsoulas (1991). The Concept of Consciousness: The Interpersonal Meaning. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 21 (September):63-89.
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  7. Thomas Natsoulas (1999). The Concept of Consciousness: The General State Meaning. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 29 (1):59-87.
    Considered here is the last one of the six basic concepts of consciousness that The Oxford English Dictionary identifies in its several entries under consciousness. The referent of the sixth concept, which I call “consciousness6”, is rightly understood to be a certain general operating mode of the mind. Any psychological account of consciousness6 must distinguish this operating mode from the “particular consciousness or awarenesses”, i.e., the specific thoughts, feelings, perceptions, intentions, and the like , that occur while the mind is (...)
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  8.  49
    Thomas Natsoulas (1997). Blindsight and Consciousness. American Journal of Psychology 110:1-33.
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  9.  6
    Thomas Natsoulas (1989). An Examination of Four Objections to Self-Intimating States of Consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 10 (1):63-116.
  10.  1
    Thomas Natsoulas (1985). George Herbert Mead' S Conception of Consciousness. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 15 (1):60–75.
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  11.  28
    Thomas Natsoulas (1991). Why Do Things Look as They Do? Some Gibsonian Answers to Koffka's Question. Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):183-202.
  12.  3
    Thomas Natsoulas (1990). The Pluralistic Approach to the Nature of Feelings. Journal of Mind and Behavior 11 (2):173-218.
    This article contains an initial statement of the pluralistic approach together with some justification for its adoption by psychologists. Two alternative coneptions of the nature of feelings, William James's and Edmund Husserl's, are discussed with the pluralistic approach in mind. Psychologists who would practice the pluralistic approach with respect to the nature of feelings must develop a plural conception of the nature of feelings. A plural conception differs from a singular conception by simultaneously including more than a single account of (...)
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  13. Thomas Natsoulas (1978). Consciousness. American Psychologist 33:906-14.
     
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  14.  39
    Thomas Natsoulas (1992). The Concept of Consciousness: The Awareness Meaning. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 22 (2):199-225.
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  15. Thomas Natsoulas (1979). The Unity of Consciousness. Behaviorism 7 (2):45-63.
     
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  16. Thomas Natsoulas (1978). Toward a Model for Consciousness in the Light of BF Skinner's Contribution. Behaviorism 6 (2):139-175.
  17.  2
    Thomas Natsoulas (1991). The Concept of Consciousness: The Personal Meaning. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 21 (September):339-67.
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  18. Thomas Natsoulas (1982). Conscious Perception and the Paradox of "Blind-Sight". In G. Underwood (ed.), Aspects of Consciousness, Volume 3: Awareness and Self-Awareness. Academic Press
     
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  19.  1
    Thomas Natsoulas (1986). On the Radical Behaviorist Conception of Cosciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 7 (1).
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  20.  7
    Thomas Natsoulas (1984). Towards the Improvement of Gibsonian Perception Theory. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 14 (2):231–258.
  21. Thomas Natsoulas (1991). Ontological Subjectivity. Journal of Mind and Behavior 175 (2):175-200.
    Addressed here are certain relations among intentionality, consciousness, and subjectivity which Searle has lately been calling our attention, while arguing that certain brain-occurrences possess irreducibly subjective features - in the sense that no amount of strictly objective, third-person information about the animal and his or her brain and behavior could result in a description of any such features, except by inference based on the first-person perspective. In his relevant discussions, Searle has focused on the aspectual shapes of conscious mental brain-occurrences, (...)
     
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  22.  1
    Thomas Natsoulas (1996). The Case for Intrinsic Theory: II. An Examination of a Conception of Consciousness 'Subscript 4' as Intrinsic, Necessary, and Concomitant. Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (4):369-390.
    The present article is the second one in a series and begins to spell out the case for the intrinsic kind of theory of consciousness4. According to such theory, a mental-occurrence instance is conscious4 on its own, that is, as a part of its own internal structure. Considered here are a prominent phenomenologist’s argument in favor of an intrinsic theory of consciousness4, and his conception of how such inner awareness occurs in the case of objectivating mental acts, which are all (...)
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  23. Thomas Natsoulas (1993). The Stream of Consciousness: William James's Specious Present. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 12:367-385.
  24.  44
    Thomas Natsoulas (1987). Roger W. Sperry's Monist Interactionism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 8:1-21.
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  25.  11
    Thomas Natsoulas (1977). Consciousness: Consideration of an Inferential Hypothesis. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 7 (April):29-39.
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  26.  7
    Thomas Natsoulas (1994). The Concept of Consciousness4 the Reflective Meaning. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (4):373–400.
    In this article, which is fourth in a series of six articles, I address the fourth concept of consciousness that the Oxford English Dictionary defines in its six main entries under the word consciousness. I first introduce this fourth concept, the concept of consciousness4. by identifying the previous three OED concepts of consciousness, which I have already discussed in this series of articles, and by indicating how that to which we make reference, respectively, by means of those three concepts is (...)
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  27.  1
    Thomas Natsoulas (1992). The Concept of Consciousness: The Awareness Meaning. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 2 (2):199-25.
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  28.  63
    Thomas Natsoulas (2002). On the Intrinsic Nature of States of Consciousness: O'Shaughnessy and the Mythology of the Attention. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):35-64.
    What are the states of consciousness in themselves, those pulses of mentality that follow one upon another in tight succession and constitute the stream of consciousness? William James conceives of each of them as being, typically, a complex unitary awareness that instantiates many features and takes a multiplicity of objects. In contrast, Brian O?Shaughnessy claims that the basic durational component of the stream of consciousness is the attention, which he understands to be something like a psychic space that is simultaneously (...)
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  29.  8
    Thomas Natsoulas (1999). A Rediscovery of Presence. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (1):17-41.
    When we see Wilfrid Sellars's favorite object, an ice cube pink through and through, we see the very pinkness of it. Inner awareness of our visual experience finds the ice cube to be experientially present, not merely representationally present to our consciousness. Its pinkness and other properties are present not merely metaphorically, not merely in the sense that the experience represents or is an occurrent belief in the ice cube's being there before us. Despite his behavioristic inclinations, Sellars acknowledges experiential (...)
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  30. Thomas Natsoulas (1999). The Case for Intrinsic Theory IV: An Argument From How Conscious Mental-Occurrence Instances Seem. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (3):257-276.
    More consistently than Aron Gurwitsch, whose intrinsic account of consciousness4 was the topic of the previous two articles of the present series, David Woodruff Smith maintains that, within any objectivating act that is its object, inner awareness is inextricably interwoven with the outer awareness that is involved in the act. I begin here an examination of arguments Woodruff Smith proffers pro an understanding of inner awareness as intrinsic. However, in the present article, I give attention only to one of his (...)
     
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  31.  14
    Thomas Natsoulas (1990). Reflective Seeing: An Exploration in the Company of Edmund Husserl and James J. Gibson. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 21 (1):1-31.
    Discusses reflective seeing in the context of the works of J. J. Gibson (published 1963–79) and E. Husserl (published 1960–83). Topics discussed include (1) naive-realistic seeing, (2) the nature of visual experiences, (3) the relation of reflective seeing to naive-realistic seeing, and (4) levels of consciousness with reference to reflective seeing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
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  32.  55
    Thomas Natsoulas (1988). Sympathy, Empathy, and the Stream of Consciousness. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 18 (June):169-195.
  33. Thomas Natsoulas (2006). The Case for Intrinsic Theory: XII. Inner Awareness Conceived of as a Modal Character of Conscious Experiences. Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (3-4):183-214.
     
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  34. Thomas Natsoulas (1996). The Case for Intrinsic Theory: I. An Introduction. Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (3):267-286.
    This is the introductory installment in a projected series of articles in which I shall be advancing the positive case for the "intrinsic" kind of explanatory account of "consciousness4." "Consciousness4" has reference to a property of individual mental-occurrence instances wherein there takes place an immediate awareness of them either upon their occurrence or as part of their very occurrence. The immediacy or directness of such inner awareness amounts to the absence of mental mediation by any other occurrent awareness. An account (...)
     
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  35. Thomas Natsoulas (1983). A Selective Review of Conceptions of Consciousness with Special Reference to Behavioristic Contributions. Cognition and Brain Theory 6:417-47.
     
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  36. Thomas Natsoulas (1987). Consciousness and Commissurotomy:. Spheres and Streams of Consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 8 (2):435-468.
     
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  37. Thomas Natsoulas (2001). The Concrete State: The Basic Components of James's Stream of Consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (4):427-449.
    The basic components of James’s stream of consciousness are considered concretely and in a way that tends to be relatively neutral from a theoretical perspective. My ultimate goal is a general description of the states of consciousness, but I try here to be more “observational” than “theoretical” about them. Giving attention to James’s reports of his personal firsthand evidence, I proceed as though I were conversing with this most phenomenological and radically empirical of psychological authors. I disagree with James on (...)
     
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  38. Thomas Natsoulas (2003). The Stream of Consciousness: XXVIII. Does Consciousness Exist? (First Part). Imagination, Cognition and Personality 23 (2):121-141.
     
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  39. Thomas Natsoulas (2006). The Stream of Consciousness: XXIX. Does Consciousness Exist? (Second Part). Imagination, Cognition and Personality 25 (1):69-84.
     
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  40. Thomas Natsoulas (1992). Toward an Improved Understanding of Sigmund Freud's Conception of Consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (2):171-92.
    This article seeks to render Sigmund Freud's unfamiliar conception of consciousness more evident and accessible; because Freud was the greatest theorist psychology has so far known, and because present-day psychologists stand in special need of a variety of conceptual frameworks in whose terms they can give coherent and cogent expression to their different hypotheses pertaining to consciousness. The three main sections respectively address Freud's complex property of intrinsic consciousness, which characterizes each instance of every conscious psychical process and includes qualitative (...)
     
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  41.  12
    Thomas Natsoulas (1992). Intentionality, Consciousness, and Subjectivity. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (3):281-308.
    Searle restricted intrinsic intentionality to occurrent neurophysiological states that are conscious in the sense that their owner has awareness of them when they occur; all occurrent nonconscious states of the brain have, at most, a derivative intentionality by reliably producing, unless obstructed, conscious intentional states. The grounds for thus restricting intrinsic intentionality are explored, and traced to Searle's conviction that aspectual shapes must be "manifest" whenever actually exemplified by an instance of any mental brain-occurrence. By "manifest," Searle seems to mean (...)
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  42.  5
    Thomas Natsoulas (1992). Appendage Theory -- Pro and Con. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (4):371-96.
    Appendage theory seeks to identify the property of consciousness that makes conscious mental-occurrence instances conscious. For some years, Rosenthal has been proposing such a theory according to which "state consciousness" is due to a thought that accompanies, without apparent inference, each conscious mental state and affirms its occurrence. Every higher-order thought has reference to oneself as such, as well as to the target mental state. This is necessary, according to Rosenthal; otherwise, the higher-order thought would not find its target, would (...)
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  43.  17
    Thomas Natsoulas (1990). Is Consciousness What Psychologists Actually Examine? American Journal of Psychology 105:363-84.
  44.  5
    Thomas Natsoulas (1989). The Distinction Between Visual Perceiving and Visual Perceptual Experience. Journal of Mind and Behavior 10 (1):37-61.
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  45.  4
    Thomas Natsoulas (1995). How Access-Consciousness Might Be a Kind of Consiousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):264.
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  46. Thomas Natsoulas (2004). To See Things is to Perceive What They Afford: James J. Gibson's Concept of Affordance. Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (4):323-347.
    Gibson distinguishes among the properties of environmental things their affordances, which he identifies in terms of that which a thing offers an animal for good or ill. In large part, this article considers his conception of environmental affordances and visually perceiving them, with special attention to the concept of affordance that he exercises in the presentation of his conception. Particular emphasis is placed here on the distinction between the affordance properties of things themselves, and what it is that these things (...)
     
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  47.  34
    Thomas Natsoulas (2000). On the Intrinsic Nature of States of Consciousness: Further Considerations in the Light of James's Conception. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):139-166.
    How are the states of consciousness intrinsically so that they all qualify as ?feelings? in William James?s generic sense? Only a small, propaedeutic part of what is required to address the intrinsic nature of such states can be accomplished here. I restrict my topic mainly to a certain characteristic that belongs to each of those pulses of mentality that successively make up James?s stream of consciousness. Certain statements of James?s are intended to pick out the variable ?width? belonging to a (...)
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  48. Thomas Natsoulas (1986). Consciousness and Memory. Journal of Mind and Behavior 7 (4):463-501.
     
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  49.  34
    Thomas Natsoulas (2001). The Freudian Conscious. Consciousness and Emotion. Special Issue 2 (1):1-28.
    To reduce the likelihood that psychology will develop in a deeply flawed manner, the present article seeks to provide an introduction to Freud?s conception of consciousness because, for among other reasons, his general theory is highly influential in our science and culture and among the best understood by clinicians and experimentalists. The theory is complex and all of its major parts have a bearing on one another; indeed, consciousness has a central place in the total conceptual structure ? as is (...)
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  50. Thomas Natsoulas (1986). Concerning the Unity of Consciousness: . William James on Personal Conscious Unity. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 5:21-30.
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