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  1. Thomas Natsoulas (forthcoming). The Varieties of Religious Experience Considered From the Perspective of James's Account of the Stream of Consciousness. Consciousness and Emotion. Agency, Conscious Choice, and Selective Perception, Amsterdam.
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  2. Thomas Natsoulas (2006). On the Temporal Continuity of Human Consciousness: Is James's Firsthand Description, After All, "Inept"? Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (2):121-148.
    Contrary to James's emphasis on the sensible continuity of each personal consciousness, our purported "stream," as it presents itself to us, is not accurately described as having a flowing temporal structure; thus Strawson has argued based on how he finds his own consciousness to be. Accordingly, qua object of inner awareness, our consciousness is best characterized as constituted successively by pulses of consciousness separated in time, one from the next, by a momentary state of complete unconsciousness. It seems at times (...)
     
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  3. Thomas Natsoulas (2006). The Case for Intrinsic Theory: XIII. The Role of the Qualitative in a Modal Account of Inner Awareness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (3-4):319-350.
    Theorists of consciousness differ in respect to whether they hold that all or some of our states of consciousness possess a qualitative character, and in respect to whether they hold that all or some of our states of consciousness possess a reflexive character. This article mainly discusses one such theory, wherein it is proposed that both the qualitative character and the reflexive character are intrinsic to each state of consciousness that possesses them and are modal characters of each state of (...)
     
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  4. Thomas Natsoulas (2006). The Case for Intrinsic Theory: XII. Inner Awareness Conceived of as a Modal Character of Conscious Experiences. Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (3-4):183-214.
     
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  5. Thomas Natsoulas (2006). The Stream of Consciousness: XXIX. Does Consciousness Exist? (Second Part). Imagination, Cognition and Personality 25 (1):69-84.
     
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  6. Thomas Natsoulas (2005). Freud's Phenomenology of the Emotions. Consciousness and Emotion: Agency, Conscious Choice, and Selective Perception 1:217.
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  7. Thomas Natsoulas (2005). On the Intrinsic Nature of States of Consciousness: A Thesis of Neutral Monism Considered. Journal of Mind and Behavior 26 (4):281-305.
    The general problem as to the intrinsic nature of the states of consciousness is what these are in themselves, what intrinsic properties they have as the occurrences that they are. William James later holds them to be “pure experiences”; they are intrinsically neutral, not mental or physical, though they are commonly taken as such. This is part of a major ontological revision of James’s well-known earlier approach, since he now holds everything extant is pure experience. In “Does Consciousness Exist?” — (...)
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  8. Thomas Natsoulas (2004). The Case for Intrinsic Theory: X. A Phenomenologist's Account of Inner Awareness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (2):97-121.
    This article is in large part an exposition and interpretation of the Woodruff Smith intrinsic-theoretical account of inner awareness. And, it is propaedeutic to considering, subsequently in the present series, the first of six theses regarding inner awareness that Kriegel defended in a recently published issue of this journal. Included here, as well, is some of the relevant background about intrinsic theory and other theories of inner awareness. Kriegel defended his first thesis with special critical reference to phenomenologist Woodruff Smith’s (...)
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  9. Thomas Natsoulas (2004). The Case for Intrinsic Theory IX . Further Discussion of an Equivocal Remembrance Account. Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (1):7-32.
    I go on here with my endeavor to ascertain intrinsic-theoretical elements that are explicitly or implicitly present in O’Shaughnessy’s remembrance account of inner awareness, or the immediate cognitive awareness that we have of some of our own mental-occurrence instances. According to an intrinsic theory of such awareness, a directly apprehended state of consciousness includes in its own structure inner awareness of itself. I seek to understand those distinct mental-occurrence instances which O’Shaughnessy holds are the cognitive inner awarenesses of our experiences. (...)
     
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  10. Thomas Natsoulas (2004). The Case for Intrinsic Theory XI: A Disagreement Regarding the Kind of Feature Inner Awareness Is. Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (3):187-211.
    Motivating this article, as well as the immediately preceding article in the present series, is Kriegel’s recent “Intrinsic Theory and the Content of Inner Awareness,” which consists of a defense of six theses regarding the content of inner awareness. I address here only the first of these six theses, along the very same lines as Kriegel does, that is, with special reference to Woodruff Smith’s phenomenological conception of inner awareness. The first thesis is as follows: “Inner awareness is . . (...)
     
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  11. Thomas Natsoulas (2004). To See Things is to Perceive What They Afford: James J. Gibson's Concept of Affordance. Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (4):323-347.
    Gibson distinguishes among the properties of environmental things their affordances, which he identifies in terms of that which a thing offers an animal for good or ill. In large part, this article considers his conception of environmental affordances and visually perceiving them, with special attention to the concept of affordance that he exercises in the presentation of his conception. Particular emphasis is placed here on the distinction between the affordance properties of things themselves, and what it is that these things (...)
     
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  12. Thomas Natsoulas (2003). The Case for Intrinsic Theory: VII. An Equivocal Remembrance Theory. Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (1):1-27.
    O’Shaughnessy advocates an account of inner awareness that I would categorize as a remembrance theory. Accordingly, as the consciousness stream is proceeding, one is normally acquiring without any occurrent conceptual awareness of one’s experiences, thus silently and automatically, a latent knowledge of these experiences that can subsequently provide experiential remembrances of them. It is these remembrances that are proposed to be one’s inner awareness of one’s experiences: occurrent non-inferential conceptual awarenesses of the latter. Although O’Shaughnessy argues contra one’s having intrinsic (...)
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  13. Thomas Natsoulas (2003). The Case for Intrinsic Theory VIII: The Experiential in Acquiring Knowledge Firsthand of One's Experiences. Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (3-4):289-316.
    Discussion continues here of a theory I have previously described as being an equivocal remembrance theory of inner awareness, the direct appre-hension of one’s own mental-occurrence instances . O’Shaughnessy claims that we acquire knowledge of each of our experiences as it occurs, yet any occurrent cognitive awareness of it that we may have comes later and is mediated by memory. Thus, acquiring knowledge of an experience firsthand is automatic and silent, not a matter of experientially apprehending the experience. Although O’Shaughnessy (...)
     
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  14. Thomas Natsoulas (2003). The Stream of Consciousness: XXVIII. Does Consciousness Exist? (First Part). Imagination, Cognition and Personality 23 (2):121-141.
     
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  15. Thomas Natsoulas (2003). Viewing the World in Perspective, Noticing the Perspectives of Things: James J. Gibson's Concept. Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (3-4):265-288.
    Gibson distinguishes among activities of the visual system, including viewing a room as opposed to seeing it, and, in effect, between a visual-system activity and the stream of experience that is a product and part of it. During viewing, one perceives the surfaces projecting light to one's point of observation, and one’s location in relation to them. Thus, one does not view some of the surfaces that one sees when, instead, one engages in straightforward seeing at the same observation point. (...)
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  16. Thomas Natsoulas (2003). What is This Autonoetic Consciousness? Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2):229-254.
    As Tulving argues, concepts shape psychologists’ thinking and determine how the end products of research are recorded. Currently in prominent use is not only Tulving’s concept of episodic memory but also his allied concept of autonoetic consciousness. And because, too, of the growing attention by psychologists to aspects of their subjects’ consciousness streams, I explore Tulving’s concept of autonoetic consciousness: to help improve the exercise of consciousness concepts in psychology generally. Two special topics among others are discussed: the “flavor” Tulving (...)
     
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  17. Thomas Natsoulas (2002). Freud and Consciousness: XII. Agreements and Disagreements. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought 25 (3):281-328.
  18. Thomas Natsoulas (2002). Missing the Experiential Presence of Environmental Objects: A Construal of Immediate Sensible Representations as Conceptual. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (4):325-350.
    McDowell does not succeed in his effort toward accounting for the wonder of nature that the experiential presence of environmental objects is, owing to his exclusive attention to the conceptual capacities involved. Thus, he construes immediate sensible representations to be involuntary actualizations of conceptual capacities exercised in judging and speech. Only in possessing propositional contents to the effect of being caused to occur by their respective objects, are immediate sensible representations proposed to differ from thoughts evoked by their objects, and (...)
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  19. Thomas Natsoulas (2002). On the Intrinsic Nature of States of Consciousness: O'Shaughnessy and the Mythology of the Attention. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):35-64.
    What are the states of consciousness in themselves, those pulses of mentality that follow one upon another in tight succession and constitute the stream of consciousness? William James conceives of each of them as being, typically, a complex unitary awareness that instantiates many features and takes a multiplicity of objects. In contrast, Brian O?Shaughnessy claims that the basic durational component of the stream of consciousness is the attention, which he understands to be something like a psychic space that is simultaneously (...)
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  20. Thomas Natsoulas (2002). The Experiential Presence of Objects to Perceptual Consciousness: Wilfrid Sellars, Sense Impressions, and Perceptual Takings. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):293-316.
    Discussion of W. Sellars's rediscovery of experiential presence continues with special reference to J. McDowell's and J.F. Rosenberg's recent articles on Sellars's understanding of perception, and a later effort by Sellars to cast light on the intimate relation between sensing and perceptual taking. Five main sections respectively summarize my earlier discussion of Sellars's account of experiential presence, draw on Rosenberg's explication of two Sellarsian modes of responding to sense impressions, consider McDowell's claim that Sellars's perceptual takings are shapings of sensory (...)
     
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  21. Thomas Natsoulas (2001). On the Intrinsic Nature of States of Consciousness: Attempted Inroads From the First Person Perspective. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (3):219-248.
    The Jamesian streams of consciousness are each made up of states of consciousness one at a time in tight temporal succession except when a stream stops flowing momentarily or for a longer time. These pulses of mentality are typically complex in the sense of their possessing, each of them, many ingredients or features. But, also, every state of consciousness is, in a different sense, simple: a unitary awareness, a single mental act. Although unitary, a state of consciousness often has many (...)
     
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  22. Thomas Natsoulas (2001). The Case for Intrinsic Theory V: Some Arguments From James's Varieties. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (1):41-67.
    This and the planned next article of the present series mine the wealth of reports and astute discussions of states of consciousness contained in William James’s The Varieties of Religious Experience. Thus, I bring out further arguments in favor of the kind of understanding of consciousness4, or inner awareness, that, as it happens, James explicitly opposed in The Principles of Psychology. The alternative, appendage kind of account that James advanced there for consciousness4 stands in marked contrast to intrinsic theory: by (...)
     
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  23. Thomas Natsoulas (2001). The Case for Intrinsic Theory: Incompatibilities Within the Stream of Consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (2):119-145.
    In The Varieties of Religious Experience, James explores in some depth, among much else, a kind of dividedness that can exist within the stream of consciousness — “the divided self.” This condition of the stream consists in crucial part of a phenomenological heterogeneity, inconsistency, discordance, or division of which disapproving notice is taken subjectively. The pertinent discordance exists among states of consciousness that comprise the same stream, is evident directly to inner awareness, and is not necessarily a matter of positing (...)
     
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  24. Thomas Natsoulas (2001). The Concrete State: The Basic Components of James's Stream of Consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (4):427-449.
    The basic components of James’s stream of consciousness are considered concretely and in a way that tends to be relatively neutral from a theoretical perspective. My ultimate goal is a general description of the states of consciousness, but I try here to be more “observational” than “theoretical” about them. Giving attention to James’s reports of his personal firsthand evidence, I proceed as though I were conversing with this most phenomenological and radically empirical of psychological authors. I disagree with James on (...)
     
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  25. Thomas Natsoulas (2001). The Concrete State Continued. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (4):451-474.
    I continue here to consider concretely the states of consciousness that are held to be the fundamental durational components of James’s famous stream — my ideal purpose being to arrive eventually at a general description applicable to every one of them. I closely attend therefore to James’s account of the sense of personal identity, not for its own sake but for what it further reveals regarding the specific states of consciousness that James called individually “the present, judging Thought.” These states, (...)
     
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  26. Thomas Natsoulas (2001). The Freudian Conscious. Consciousness and Emotion. Special Issue 2 (1):1-28.
    To reduce the likelihood that psychology will develop in a deeply flawed manner, the present article seeks to provide an introduction to Freud?s conception of consciousness because, for among other reasons, his general theory is highly influential in our science and culture and among the best understood by clinicians and experimentalists. The theory is complex and all of its major parts have a bearing on one another; indeed, consciousness has a central place in the total conceptual structure ? as is (...)
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  27. Thomas Natsoulas (2001). The Stream of Consciousness: XXV. Awareness as Commentary (Part I). Imagination, Cognition and Personality 21 (4):347-366.
     
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  28. Thomas Natsoulas (2000). Consciousness and Conscience. Journal of Mind and Behavior 21 (4):327-352.
    The "intrapersonal together sense" is one of several meanings of the English words conscious and consciousness. C.S. Lewis identified the intrapersonal together sense as analogous to the "interpersonal sense" of these same words: a sense that goes back, too, to ancient times, millennia before the two words entered the English language. Whereas the interpersonal sense of consciousness picks out a certain kind of relation that exists, has existed, or will exist between two or a few people, the intrapersonal together sense (...)
     
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  29. Thomas Natsoulas (2000). Freud and Consciousness: X. The Place of Consciousness in Freud's Science. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought 23 (4):525-561.
  30. Thomas Natsoulas (2000). On the Intrinsic Nature of States of Consciousness: Further Considerations in the Light of James's Conception. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):139-166.
    How are the states of consciousness intrinsically so that they all qualify as ?feelings? in William James?s generic sense? Only a small, propaedeutic part of what is required to address the intrinsic nature of such states can be accomplished here. I restrict my topic mainly to a certain characteristic that belongs to each of those pulses of mentality that successively make up James?s stream of consciousness. Certain statements of James?s are intended to pick out the variable ?width? belonging to a (...)
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  31. Thomas Natsoulas (2000). The Stream of Consciousness: XXII. Apprehension and the Feeling Aspect. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 20 (3):275-295.
  32. Thomas Natsoulas (1999). A Commentary System for Consciousness?! Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (2):155-181.
    Critically considered here is a proposal that Weiskrantz has advanced in a recently published book on brain-damaged individuals. It is a proposal regarding the locus, nature, and character of consciousness in general. Every instance of being conscious, or aware, or having experience of anything , is supposed to be identical to either one of three kinds of activity of a commentary system in the brain that correspond to the Skinnerian distinction between overt, covert, and incipient responses. Any human or animal (...)
     
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  33. Thomas Natsoulas (1999). A Rediscovery of Presence. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (1):17-41.
    When we see Wilfrid Sellars's favorite object, an ice cube pink through and through, we see the very pinkness of it. Inner awareness of our visual experience finds the ice cube to be experientially present, not merely representationally present to our consciousness. Its pinkness and other properties are present not merely metaphorically, not merely in the sense that the experience represents or is an occurrent belief in the ice cube's being there before us. Despite his behavioristic inclinations, Sellars acknowledges experiential (...)
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  34. Thomas Natsoulas (1999). The Case for Intrinsic Theory IV: An Argument From How Conscious Mental-Occurrence Instances Seem. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (3):257-276.
    More consistently than Aron Gurwitsch, whose intrinsic account of consciousness4 was the topic of the previous two articles of the present series, David Woodruff Smith maintains that, within any objectivating act that is its object, inner awareness is inextricably interwoven with the outer awareness that is involved in the act. I begin here an examination of arguments Woodruff Smith proffers pro an understanding of inner awareness as intrinsic. However, in the present article, I give attention only to one of his (...)
     
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  35. Thomas Natsoulas (1999). The Concept of Consciousness: The General State Meaning. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 29 (1):59-87.
    Considered here is the last one of the six basic concepts of consciousness that The Oxford English Dictionary identifies in its several entries under consciousness. The referent of the sixth concept, which I call “consciousness6”, is rightly understood to be a certain general operating mode of the mind. Any psychological account of consciousness6 must distinguish this operating mode from the “particular consciousness or awarenesses”, i.e., the specific thoughts, feelings, perceptions, intentions, and the like , that occur while the mind is (...)
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  36. Thomas Natsoulas (1999). Virtual Objects. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (4):357-377.
    What should be done theoretically regarding those "virtual objects" that James J. Gibson refers to several times in his last book? Does not Gibson's view that we visually perceive, sometimes, items that are merely "virtual" produce a contradiction within his theory of visual perceiving? How can something unable itself to have effects on what occurs in the visual system justifiably be claimed to be an object of visual perceiving? I address among other issues: whether there is a sense in which (...)
     
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  37. Thomas Natsoulas (1998). Field of View. Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (4):415-436.
    Two concepts of field of view are spelled out, the ordinary concept defined by the dictionary and the technical concept devised by Gibson and put to work in his ecological account of visual perceiving. The dictionaryís concept refers to an area of the environment taken from a particular viewpoint; from this viewpoint, there are some objects visible throughout the geographical area constituting the corresponding field of view. The technical concept refers to the total large solid angle of light that projects (...)
     
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  38. Thomas Natsoulas (1998). Tertiary Consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (2):141-176.
    Direct awareness, or the immediate, on-the-spot, noninferential access that we have to some of our mental-occurrence instances, is a kind of "secondary consciousness." It often happens, in addition, that direct awareness itself is conscious, meaning that one is also directly aware of being so aware. This is "tertiary consciousness." Indeed, absent tertiary consciousness, one could not base actions on what is mentally occurring to one now. Although Armstrong held that "subliminal introspection" suffices for purposive mental activity, tertiary consciousness would seem (...)
     
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  39. Thomas Natsoulas (1998). The Case for Intrinsic Theory. Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (1):267-85.
    Aron Gurwitsch, phenomenologist and intrinsic theorist of consciousness4, contends that every objectivating mental act necessarily involves inner awareness; whenever an objectivating act occurs, it is an intentional object of unmediated apprehension. Moreover, inner awareness is literally intrinsic to every objectivating mental act, a part of its very own individual structure. Gurwitsch further argues that inner awareness is a merely concomitant part of that structure, taking place at the margin of the particular objectivating act, for the reason that the content of (...)
     
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  40. Thomas Natsoulas (1998). The Case for Intrinsic Theory: III. Intrinsic Inner Awareness and the Problem of Straightforward Objectivation. Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (1):1-19.
    Aron Gurwitsch, phenomenologist and intrinsic theorist of consciousness4, contends that every objectivating mental act necessarily involves inner awareness; whenever an objectivating act occurs, it is an intentional object of unmediated apprehension. Moreover, inner awareness is literally intrinsic to every objectivating mental act, a part of its very own individual structure. Gurwitsch further argues that inner awareness is a merely concomitant part of that structure, taking place at the margin of the particular objectivating act, for the reason that the content of (...)
     
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  41. Thomas Natsoulas (1997). Blindsight and Consciousness. American Journal of Psychology 110:1-33.
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  42. Thomas Natsoulas (1997). Consciousness and Self-Awareness: Consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (1):53-94.
  43. Thomas Natsoulas (1997). Consciousness and Self Awareness. 2. Consciousness (4), Consciousness (5), and Consciousness (6). Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (1):53-74.
    Published in two parts, the present article addresses whether self-awareness is necessarily involved in each of the six kinds of consciousness that The Oxford English Dictionary identifies under the word consciousness. Part I inquires into how, if at all, self-awareness enters consciousness1: a cognitive relation between people in which they have joint and mutual cognizance; consciousness2: a psychological process of conceiving of oneself in certain sorts of respects on a firsthand evidentiary basis; and consciousness3: being occurrently aware of anything at (...)
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  44. Thomas Natsoulas (1997). Consciousness and Self-Awareness: Part II: Consciousness4, Consciousness5, and Consciousness6. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (1):75-94.
    Published in two parts, the present article addresses whether and how self-awareness is necessarily involved in each of the six kinds of consciousness that The Oxford English Dictionary identifies in its entry for the word consciousness. In this second part, I inquire into how self-awareness enters consciousness4, or the immediate awareness that we have of our mental-occurrence instances, consciousness5, or the constitution of the totality of mental-occurrence instances which is the person’s conscious being, and consciousness6, or the highly adaptive general (...)
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  45. Thomas Natsoulas (1997). The Presence of Environmental Objects to Perceptual Consciousness: An Integrative, Ecological and Phenomenological Approach. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (4):371-390.
    This article is the promised sequel to a recently published article in this journal , in which I sought to make more available to psychologists Edmund Husserl’s attempted explanation of how perceptual mental acts succeed in presenting to consciousness their external, environmental objects themselves, as opposed to some kind of representation of them. Here, I continue my exposition of Husserl’s effort and, as well, I begin a project of seeking to bridge the gap between his phenomenological account of perceptual presence (...)
     
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  46. Thomas Natsoulas (1996). Freud and Consciousness I-XI. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought 7:195-232.
  47. Thomas Natsoulas (1996). The Case for Intrinsic Theory: II. An Examination of a Conception of Consciousness 'Subscript 4' as Intrinsic, Necessary, and Concomitant. Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (4):369-390.
    The present article is the second one in a series and begins to spell out the case for the intrinsic kind of theory of consciousness4. According to such theory, a mental-occurrence instance is conscious4 on its own, that is, as a part of its own internal structure. Considered here are a prominent phenomenologist’s argument in favor of an intrinsic theory of consciousness4, and his conception of how such inner awareness occurs in the case of objectivating mental acts, which are all (...)
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  48. Thomas Natsoulas (1996). The Case for Intrinsic Theory: I. An Introduction. Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (3):267-286.
    This is the introductory installment in a projected series of articles in which I shall be advancing the positive case for the "intrinsic" kind of explanatory account of "consciousness4." "Consciousness4" has reference to a property of individual mental-occurrence instances wherein there takes place an immediate awareness of them either upon their occurrence or as part of their very occurrence. The immediacy or directness of such inner awareness amounts to the absence of mental mediation by any other occurrent awareness. An account (...)
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  49. Thomas Natsoulas (1996). The Sciousness Hypothesis: Part I. Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (1):45-66.
    The Sciousness Hypothesis holds that how we know our mental-occurrence instances does not include our having immediate awareness of them. Rather, we take notice of our behaviors or bodily reactions and infer mental-occurrence instances that would explain them. In The Principles, James left it an open question whether the Sciousness Hypothesis is true, and proceeded in accordance with the conviction that one’s stream of consciousness consists only of basic durational components of which one has immediate awareness. Nevertheless, James seems to (...)
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  50. Thomas Natsoulas (1996). The Sciousness Hypothesis — Part II. Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (2):185-206.
    The Sciousness Hypothesis holds that how we know our mental-occurrence instances does not include our having immediate awareness of them. Rather, we take notice of our behaviors or bodily reactions and infer mental-occurrence instances that would explain them. In The Principles, James left it an open question whether the Sciousness Hypothesis is true, although he proceeded on the conviction that one’s mental life consists exclusively of mental-occurrence instances of which one has immediate awareness. Nevertheless, James was tempted by the Sciousness (...)
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