The scientific untraceability of phenomenal consciousness

Philosophia 36 (4):509-529 (2008)
It is a common conviction among philosophers who hold that phenomenal properties, qualia, are distinct from any cognitive, intentional, or functional properties, that it is possible to trace the neural correlates of these properties. The main purpose of this paper is to present a challenge to this view, and to show that if “non-cognitive” phenomenal properties exist at all, they lie beyond the reach of neuroscience. In the final section it will be suggested that they also lie beyond the reach of psychology, so that they may be said to lie beyond the reach of science.
Keywords Consciousness  Phenomenal consciousness  Qualia  Neural correlate  NCC  The neural correlate of consciousness  Phenomenism  Non-cognitivism
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-008-9126-8
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.

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