The rationality of belief and other propositional attitudes

Philosophical Studies 110 (2):163-96 (2002)
In this paper, I explore the question of whether the expected consequences of holding a belief can affect the rationality of doing so. Special attention is given to various ways in which one might attempt to exert some measure of control over what one believes and the normative status of the beliefs that result from the successful execution of such projects. I argue that the lessons which emerge from thinking about the case ofbelief have important implications for the way we should think about the rationality of a number of other propositional attitudes,such as regret, desire, and fear. Finally,I suggest that a lack of clarity with respect to the relevant issues has given rise to a number of rather serious philosophical mistakes.
Keywords Belief  Consequence  Epistemology  Normative  Propositional Attitudes  Rationality
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Susanna Rinard (2015). No Exception for Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2).
Thomas Kelly (2003). Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.

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