David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 110 (2):163-96 (2002)
In this paper, I explore the question of whether the expected consequences of holding a belief can affect the rationality of doing so. Special attention is given to various ways in which one might attempt to exert some measure of control over what one believes and the normative status of the beliefs that result from the successful execution of such projects. I argue that the lessons which emerge from thinking about the case ofbelief have important implications for the way we should think about the rationality of a number of other propositional attitudes,such as regret, desire, and fear. Finally,I suggest that a lack of clarity with respect to the relevant issues has given rise to a number of rather serious philosophical mistakes
|Keywords||Belief Consequence Epistemology Normative Propositional Attitudes Rationality|
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Citations of this work BETA
Susanna Rinard (2015). No Exception for Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2).
Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (forthcoming). If You Justifiably Believe That You Ought to Φ, You Ought to Φ. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
Susanna Rinard (2015). Against the New Evidentialists. Philosophical Issues 25 (1):208-223.
Daniel Whiting (2016). Against Second‐Order Reasons. Noûs 49 (4).
Pamela Hieronymi (2008). Responsibility for Believing. Synthese 161 (3):357-373.
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