Graduate studies at Western
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):453-467 (2012)
|Abstract||Does ?ought? imply ?can? for collectives' obligations? In this paper I want to establish two things. The first, what a collective obligation means for members of the collective. The second, how collective ability can be ascertained. I argue that there are four general kinds of obligation, which devolve from collectives to members in different ways, and I give an account of the distribution of obligation from collectives to members for each of these kinds. One implication of understanding collective obligation and ability in the proposed way is that a group can be blameworthy for failing to realize its obligation even when no member of the group is blameworthy for failing to realize her obligation|
|Keywords||Collective Obligation Collective Ability Feasibility Ought Can Collective Action Group Agency|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Stephanie Collins (2013). Collectives' Duties and Collectivisation Duties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):231-248.
Bill Wringe (2010). Global Obligations and the Agency Objection. Ratio 23 (2):217-231.
Holly Lawford-Smith (2010). Feasibility Constraints for Political Theories. Dissertation, Australian National University
Bill Wringe (forthcoming). 'Collective Obligations: Their Existence; Their Explanatory Power; and Their Supervenience on the Obligations of Individuals. European Journal of Philosophy.
Tracy Lynn Isaacs (2011). Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts. Oxford University Press.
Linda Radzik (2001). Collective Responsibility and Duties to Respond. Social Theory and Practice 27 (3):455-471.
Anne Schwenkenbecher (2011). Moral Obligations of States. In Applied Ethics Series. Center of Applied Ethics and Philosophy.
Glen Pettigrove (2006). Hannah Arendt and Collective Forgiving. Journal of Social Philosophy 37 (4):483–500.
Margaret Gilbert (2002). Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings. Journal of Ethics 6 (2):115-143.
Sara Rachel Chant & Zachary Ernst (2008). Epistemic Conditions for Collective Action. Mind 117 (467):549-573.
Sara Rachel Chant (2007). Unintentional Collective Action. Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):245 – 256.
Boris Hennig (2006). Social Facts Explained and Presupposed. In Nikos Psarros & Katinka Schulte-Ostermann (eds.), Facets of Sociality. Ontos Verlag.
Reza Lahroodi (2007). Collective Epistemic Virtues. Social Epistemology 21 (3):281 – 297.
Added to index2011-06-02
Total downloads231 ( #1,193 of 739,392 )
Recent downloads (6 months)34 ( #3,329 of 739,392 )
How can I increase my downloads?