Ignorance, truth, and falsehood

Ratio 35 (3):169-180 (2022)
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Abstract

According to the Ignorance Factivity Thesis, for every proposition p, one is ignorant of p only if p is a truth. By contrast, according to the Ignorance Non-Factivity Thesis, it is false that, for every proposition p, one is ignorant of p only if p is a truth. I argue that, on balance, the case for the latter thesis is stronger than the case for the former.

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10.1111/rati.12341

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References found in this work

White Ignorance.Charles W. Mills - 2007 - In Shannon Sullivan & Nancy Tuana (eds.), Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance. Albany, NY: State Univ of New York Pr. pp. 11-38.
Epistemic Insouciance.Quassim Cassam - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Research 43:1-20.
What is ignorance?Rik Peels - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (1):57-67.
What Kind of Ignorance Excuses? Two Neglected Issues.Rik Peels - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (256):478-496.
On Ignorance: A Reply to Peels.Pierre LeMorvan - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):335-344.

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