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Neil Feit [25]Neil Philip Feit [1]
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Profile: Neil Feit (Fredonia State University)
  1. Neil Feit & Andrew Cullison (2011). When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):283-304.
    Falsehood can preclude knowledge in many ways. A false proposition cannot be known. A false ground can prevent knowledge of a truth, or so we argue, but not every false ground deprives its subject of knowledge. A falsehood that is not a ground for belief can also prevent knowledge of a truth. This paper provides a systematic account of just when falsehood precludes knowledge, and hence when it does not. We present the paper as an approach to the Gettier problem (...)
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  2.  44
    Neil Feit (2008). Belief About the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content. Oxford University Press.
    Mental content and the problem of De Se belief -- Cognitive attitudes and content -- The doctrine of propositions -- The problem of De Se belief -- The property theory of content -- In favor of the property theory -- Perry's messy shopper and the argument from explanation -- Lewis's case of the two Gods -- Arguments from internalism and physicalism -- An inference to the best explanation -- Alternatives to the property theory -- The triadic view of belief -- (...)
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  3.  85
    Neil Feit & Alessandro Capone (2013). The Problem of De Se Attitudes: An Introduction to the Issues and the Essays. In Neil Feit & Alessandro Capone (eds.), Attitudes De Se: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics. CSLI Publications 1-25.
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  4.  20
    Daniel Howard-Snyder, Frances Howard-Snyder & Neil Feit (2003). Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304–327.
    Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can be transferred (...)
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  5.  63
    Neil Feit (2015). Plural Harm. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):361-388.
    In this paper, I construct and defend an account of harm, specifically, all-things-considered overall harm. I start with a simple comparative account, on which an event harms a person provided that she would have been better off had it not occurred. The most significant problems for this account are overdetermination and preemption cases. However, a counterfactual comparative approach of some sort is needed to make sense of harm, or so I argue. I offer a counterfactual comparative theory that accounts nicely (...)
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  6.  78
    Neil Feit (2013). Belief Reports and the Property Theory of Content. In Neil Feit & Alessandro Capone (eds.), Attitudes De Se: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics. CSLI Publications 105-31.
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  7.  65
    Neil Feit (2002). The Time of Death's Misfortune. Noûs 36 (3):359–383.
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  8.  33
    Neil Feit (2016). Comparative Harm, Creation and Death. Utilitas 28 (2):136-163.
    Given that a person's death is bad for her, when is it bad? I defend subsequentism, the view that things that are bad in the relevant way are bad after they occur. Some have objected to this view on the grounds that it requires us to compare the amount of well-being the victim would have enjoyed, had she not died, with the amount she receives while dead; however, we cannot assign any level of well-being, not even zero, to a dead (...)
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  9.  19
    Stephen Kershnar & Neil Feit (2001). The Most Valuable Player. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 28 (2):193-206.
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  10.  71
    Neil Feit (2000). Self-Ascription and Belief de Re. Philosophical Studies 98 (1):35-49.
  11.  30
    Neil Feit (2009). Naming and Nonexistence. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):239-262.
    I defend a cluster of views about names from fiction and myth. The views are based on two claims: first, proper names refer directly totheir bearers; and second, names from fiction and myth are genuinely empty, they simply do not refer. I argue that when such names are used in direct discourse, utterances containing them have truth values but do not express propositions. I also argue that it is a mistake to think that if an utterance of, for example, “Vulcan (...)
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  12.  42
    Neil Feit (2001). Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):29-55.
    The author presents and defends a general view about belief. and certain attributions of belief, with the intention of providing a solution to Saul Kripke’s puzzle about belief. According to the position developed in the paper, there are two senses in which one could be said to have contradictory beliefs. Just one of these senses threatens the rationality of the believer; but Kripke’s puzzle concerns only the other one. The general solution is then extended to certain variants of Kripke’s original (...)
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  13. Neil Feit & Stephen Kershnar (2004). Public Aefairs Quarterly. Public Affairs Quarterly 18:273.
     
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  14.  40
    Neil Feit (2003). Russellianism and Referential Uses of Descriptions. Philosophical Studies 115 (2):99 - 122.
    A number of philosophers continue to argue, inthe spirit of Keith Donnellans classic paperReference and Definite Descriptions, thatthere is more to the semantics of definitedescriptions than Russells theory predicts. If their arguments are correct, then a completesemantic theory for sentences that containdefinite descriptions will have to provide morethan one set of truth conditions. A unitaryRussellian analysis of sentences of the form`the F is G would not suffice. In this paper,I examine a recent line of argument for thisanti-Russellian conclusion.Unlike earlier Donnellan-style (...)
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  15.  25
    Neil Feit (2001). Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):29 - 55.
    The author presents and defends a general view about belief. and certain attributions of belief, with the intention of providing a solution to Saul Kripke’s puzzle about belief. According to the position developed in the paper, there are two senses in which one could be said to have contradictory beliefs. Just one of these senses threatens the rationality of the believer; but Kripke’s puzzle concerns only the other one. The general solution is then extended to certain variants of Kripke’s original (...)
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  16.  46
    Neil Feit (2003). Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304 - 327.
    Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can (...)
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  17.  41
    Neil Feit (2010). Selfless Desires and the Property Theory of Content. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):489-503.
    The property theory of content takes the content of each cognitive attitude (each belief, desire, and so on) to be a property to which the subject of the attitude is related in the appropriate psychological way. This view is motivated by standard cases of de se belief and other attitudes. In this paper, I consider a couple of related objections to the property theory of content. Both objections have to do with the possible non-existence of the subject. More specifically, the (...)
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  18.  46
    Neil Feit (1998). More on Brute Facts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):625 – 630.
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  19.  22
    Neil Feit (2001). The Structure of Higher Goods. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):47-57.
  20.  31
    Neil Feit (2006). The Doctrine of Propositions, Internalism, and Global Supervenience. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):447-457.
  21.  13
    Neil Feit (1996). On a Famous Counterexample to Leibniz's Law. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:381 - 386.
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  22.  1
    Neil Feit (1996). Graduate Papers From the Joint Session 1995: On a Famous Counterexample to Leibniz's Law. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):381-386.
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  23.  3
    Neil Feit & Stephen Kershnar (2004). Explaining the Geometry of Desert. Public Affairs Quarterly 18 (4):273-298.
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  24.  20
    Neil Feit & Alessandro Capone (eds.) (2013). Attitudes De Se: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics. CSLI Publications.
    In English, we use the word "I" to express thoughts that we have about ourselves, and we use the reflexive pronouns "himself" and "herself" to attribute such thoughts to others. Philosophers and linguists call such thoughts, and the statements we use to express them, de se. De se thoughts and statements, although they appear often in our day-to-day lives, pose a series of challenging problems for both linguists and philosophers. This interdisciplinary volume examines the structure of de se thought, various (...)
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  25. Neil Feit (2012). Self-Ascription and Self-Awareness. In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag 47--213.
     
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