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  1. Neil Feit (2013). Plural Harm. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):n/a-n/a.
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  2. Neil Feit (2012). Self-Ascription and Self-Awareness. In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag. 47--213.
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  3. Neil Feit & Andrew Cullison (2011). When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):283-304.
    Falsehood can preclude knowledge in many ways. A false proposition cannot be known. A false ground can prevent knowledge of a truth, or so we argue, but not every false ground deprives its subject of knowledge. A falsehood that is not a ground for belief can also prevent knowledge of a truth. This paper provides a systematic account of just when falsehood precludes knowledge, and hence when it does not. We present the paper as an approach to the Gettier problem (...)
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  4. Neil Feit (2010). Selfless Desires and the Property Theory of Content. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):489-503.
    The property theory of content takes the content of each cognitive attitude (each belief, desire, and so on) to be a property to which the subject of the attitude is related in the appropriate psychological way. This view is motivated by standard cases of de se belief and other attitudes. In this paper, I consider a couple of related objections to the property theory of content. Both objections have to do with the possible non-existence of the subject. More specifically, the (...)
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  5. Neil Feit (2009). Naming and Nonexistence. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):239-262.
    I defend a cluster of views about names from fiction and myth. The views are based on two claims: first, proper names refer directly totheir bearers; and second, names from fiction and myth are genuinely empty, they simply do not refer. I argue that when such names are used in direct discourse, utterances containing them have truth values but do not express propositions. I also argue that it is a mistake to think that if an utterance of, for example, “Vulcan (...)
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  6. Neil Feit (2008). Belief About the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content. Oxford University Press.
    Mental content and the problem of De Se belief -- Cognitive attitudes and content -- The doctrine of propositions -- The problem of De Se belief -- The property theory of content -- In favor of the property theory -- Perry's messy shopper and the argument from explanation -- Lewis's case of the two Gods -- Arguments from internalism and physicalism -- An inference to the best explanation -- Alternatives to the property theory -- The triadic view of belief -- (...)
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  7. Neil Feit (2006). The Doctrine of Propositions, Internalism, and Global Supervenience. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):447-457.
  8. Neil Feit & Stephen Kershnar (2004). Explaining the Geometry of Desert. Public Affairs Quarterly 18 (4):273-298.
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  9. Neil Feit & Stephen Kershnar (2004). Public Aefairs Quarterly. Public Affairs Quarterly 18:273.
     
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  10. Neil Feit (2003). Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304 - 327.
    Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can (...)
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  11. Neil Feit (2003). Russellianism and Referential Uses of Descriptions. Philosophical Studies 115 (2):99 - 122.
    A number of philosophers continue to argue, inthe spirit of Keith Donnellans classic paperReference and Definite Descriptions, thatthere is more to the semantics of definitedescriptions than Russells theory predicts. If their arguments are correct, then a completesemantic theory for sentences that containdefinite descriptions will have to provide morethan one set of truth conditions. A unitaryRussellian analysis of sentences of the form`the F is G would not suffice. In this paper,I examine a recent line of argument for thisanti-Russellian conclusion.Unlike earlier Donnellan-style (...)
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  12. Neil Feit (2002). The Time of Death's Misfortune. Noûs 36 (3):359–383.
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  13. Neil Feit (2001). Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):29-55.
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  14. Neil Feit (2001). The Structure of Higher Goods. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):47-57.
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  15. Stephen Kershnar & Neil Feit (2001). The Most Valuable Player. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 28 (2):193-206.
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  16. Neil Feit (2000). Self-Ascription and Belief de Re. Philosophical Studies 98 (1):35-49.
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  17. Neil Feit (1998). More on Brute Facts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):625 – 630.
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  18. Neil Feit (1996). On a Famous Counterexample to Leibniz's Law. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:381 - 386.
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