First-person belief and empirical certainty

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):118-136 (2010)
This is a critical exposition and limited defence of a theory of first- person belief transiently held by Roderick Chisholm after giving up the early haecceity theory of Person and Object and before adopting the late self-attribution theory of The First Person. I reconstruct that 'middle' theory as involving what I call a 'hard-core' approach to de re belief and I rebut objections concerning epistemic supervenience and abnormal consciousness. In my rebuttals, I sketch a variant of the middle theory according to which first- person belief essentially involves the believer's introspective acquaintance with herself
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01361.x
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References found in this work BETA
David Kaplan (1989). Demonstratives. In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press 481-563.
Roderick M. Chisholm (1966). Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.

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