Can connectionists explain systematicity?

Mind and Language 12 (2):154-77 (1997)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Classicists and connectionists alike claim to be able to explain systematicity. The proposed classicist explanation, I argue, is little more than a promissory note, one that classicists have no idea how to redeem. Smolensky's (1995) proposed connectionist explanation fares little better: it is not vulnerable to recent classicist objections, but it nonetheless fails, particularly if one requires, as some classicists do, that explanations of systematicity take the form of a‘functional analysis’. Nonetheless, there are, I argue, reasons for cautious optimism about the prospects of a connectionist explanation.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
104 (#154,461)

6 months
2 (#658,980)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Robert J. Matthews
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

References found in this work

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
Functional analysis.Robert E. Cummins - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (November):741-64.

View all 17 references / Add more references