Philosophy of Science 58 (3):452-467 (1991)
|Abstract||This paper attempts to clarify the meaning and significance of "qualitative confirmation". The need to do so is related to the fact that, without such a conceptualization, a large portion of the human sciences are relegated to a less than scientific status. Accordingly, "qualitative confirmation" is viewed as a proper subset of traditional confirmation theory. To establish such a case, a general Hempelian framework is utilized, but it is supplemented with two additional levels of confirmation. It is concluded that the final test for adequacy of such confirmation must rest on a subjective probability notion|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Patrick Maher (1996). Subjective and Objective Confirmation. Philosophy of Science 63 (2):149-174.
R. G. Swinburne (1970). Choosing Between Confirmation Theories. Philosophy of Science 37 (4):602-613.
Pierre Le Morvan (1999). The Converse Consequence Condition and Hempelian Qualitative Confirmation. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):448-.
G. H. Merrill (1979). Confirmation and Prediction. Philosophy of Science 46 (1):98-117.
Igor Douven & Wouter Meijs (2006). Bootstrap Confirmation Made Quantitative. Synthese 149 (1):97 - 132.
Aron Edidin (1988). From Relative Confirmation to Real Confirmation. Philosophy of Science 55 (2):265-271.
Mary Hesse (1970). Theories and the Transitivity of Confirmation. Philosophy of Science 37 (1):50-63.
Steven J. Miller & Marcel Fredericks (1989). Some Comments on the Projectibility of Anthropological Hypotheses: Samoa Briefly Revisited. Erkenntnis 30 (3):279 - 299.
Patrick Maher (2005). Qualitative Confirmation and the Ravens Paradox. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):89-108.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads6 ( #147,054 of 556,837 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,847 of 556,837 )
How can I increase my downloads?