David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Acta Analytica 24 (4):223-236 (2009)
This article outlines a conception of perceptual-recognitional abilities. These include abilities to recognize certain things from their appearance to some sensory modality, as being of some kind, or as possessing some property. An assumption of the article is that these abilities are crucial for an adequate understanding of perceptual knowledge. The specific aim here is to contrast those abilities with abilities or competences as conceived in the virtue-theoretic literature, with particular reference to views of Ernest Sosa and John Greco. In the course of the discussion, it is emphasized that the notion of exercising a perceptual-recognitional ability is a success notion: exercising such an ability is nothing less than acquiring knowledge. Even so, the view can make sense of our fallibility. It can also be defended in the face of an objection stemming from consideration of what are here called success-rate abilities.
|Keywords||Competence Greco Knowledge Perceptual-recognitional ability Sosa Virtue epistemology|
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References found in this work BETA
J. Austin (1946). Other Minds. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 20:148-87.
Alvin Goldman (1976). Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
John Greco (2009). Knowledge and Success From Ability. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):17 - 26.
John Greco (2007). The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):57–69.
Alan Millar (2008). Disjunctivism and Skepticism. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Alan Millar (2011). How Visual Perception Yields Reasons for Belief. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):332-351.
Alan Millar (2012). Scepticism, Perceptual Knowledge, and Doxastic Responsibility. Synthese 189 (2):353-372.
Alan Millar (2011). Why Knowledge Matters. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):63-81.
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