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Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):100-109 (2006)
Galen Strawson (2006) thinks it is 'obviously' false that 'the terms of physics can fully capture the nature or essence of experience' (p. 4). He also describes this view as 'crazy' (p. 7). I think that he has been carried away by first impressions. It is certainly true that 'physicSalism', as he dubs this view, is strongly counterintuitive. But at the same time there are compelling arguments in its favour. I think that these arguments are sound and that the contrary intuitions are misbegotten. In the first two sections of my remarks I would like to spend a little time defending physicSalism, or 'straightforward' physicalism, as I shall call it ('S' for 'straightforward', if you like). I realize that the main topic of Strawson's paper is panpsychism rather than his rejection of straightforward physicalism. But the latter is relevant as his arguments for panpsychism depend on his rejection of straightforward physicalism, in ways I shall explain below.
|Keywords||Consciousness Intuition Metaphysics Panpsychism Physicalism Strawson, Galen|
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Citations of this work BETA
Philip Goff (2011). A Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):191 - 209.
David Papineau (2007). Kripke's Proof is Ad Hominem Not Two-Dimensional. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):475–494.
John Henry Taylor (2013). Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts: Bringing Ontology and Philosophy of Mind Together. Philosophia 41 (4):1283-1297.
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