David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 153 (2):243 - 259 (2011)
Non-cognitivism might seem to offer a plausible account of evaluative judgments, at least on the assumption that there is a satisfactory solution to the Frege-Geach problem. However, Cian Dorr has argued that non-cognitivism remains implausible even assuming that the Frege-Geach problem can be solved, on the grounds that non-cognitivism still has to classify some paradigmatically rational inferences as irrational. Dorr's argument is ingenious and at first glance seems decisive. However, in this paper I will show that Dorr's argument equivocates between two different notions of evidence, and that once this equivocation is noted there is no reason to doubt that non-cognitivism is consistent with the rationality of such inferences, at least if it is assumed that the Frege-Geach problem can be solved. In particular, I will show that non-cognitivists can endorse the same explanation of the rationality of such inferences that cognitivists should endorse, and that there is thus no need for non-cognitivists to offer any sort of idiosyncratic account of the epistemology of such cases, in contrast to what other commentators on Dorr's argument have thought
|Keywords||Non-cognitivism Expressivism Rationality Frege–Geach problem Cian Dorr|
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References found in this work BETA
Allan Gibbard (2003). Thinking How to Live. Harvard University Press.
Mark Andrew Schroeder (2007). Slaves of the Passions. Oxford University Press.
Allan Gibbard (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Harvard University Press.
John R. Searle (1969). Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Robert Mabrito (2013). Are Expressivists Guilty of Wishful Thinking? Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1069-1081.
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