Causal probability
Synthese 132 (1-2):143 - 185 (2002)
| Abstract | Examples growing out of the Newcomb problem have convinced many people that decision theory should proceed in terms of some kind of causal probability. I endorse this view and define and investigate a variety of causal probability. My definition is related to Skyrms' definition, but proceeds in terms of objective probabilities rather than subjective probabilities and avoids taking causal dependence as a primitive concept. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,653 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesAidan Lyon (2010). Deterministic Probability: Neither Chance nor Credence. Synthese 182 (3):413-432.
Robert C. Stalnaker (1970). Probability and Conditionals. Philosophy of Science 37 (1):64-80.
Stefan Kaufmann (2004). Conditioning Against the Grain. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (6):583-606.
Ellery Eells (1986). Probabilistic Causal Interaction. Philosophy of Science 53 (1):52-64.
Michael Clark & Nicholas Shackel (2006). The Dr. Psycho Paradox and Newcomb's Problem. Erkenntnis 64 (1):85 - 100.
Thomas Müller (2005). Probability Theory and Causation: A Branching Space-Times Analysis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):487 - 520.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads16 ( #74,590 of 548,984 )Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,729 of 548,984 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
