David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 44 (2):245-268 (2010)
This paper examines the relationship between perceptual knowledge and discrimination in the light of the so-called ‘relevant alternatives’ intuition. It begins by outlining an intuitive relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge which incorporates the insight that there is a close connection between perceptual knowledge and the possession of relevant discriminatory abilities. It is argued, however, that in order to resolve certain problems that face this view, it is essential to recognise an important distinction between favouring and discriminating epistemic support that is often overlooked in the literature. This distinction complicates the story regarding how an alternative becomes relevant, and in doing so weakens the connection between perceptual knowledge and discrimination. The theory that results, however—what I term a ‘two-tiered’ relevant alternatives theory of perceptual knowledge—accommodates many of our intuitions about perceptual knowledge and so avoids the revisionism of some recent proposals in the epistemological literature
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Citations of this work BETA
J. Adam Carter, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (2014). Varieties of Externalism. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):63-109.
J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard (2016). Perceptual Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives. Philosophical Studies 173 (4):969-990.
Duncan Pritchard (2011). Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Basis Problem. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):434-455.
Robert Cowan (2015). Perceptual Intuitionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):164-193.
J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin (forthcoming). Belief Without Credence. Synthese:1-29.
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