David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press 509--22 (2009)
Higher-order vagueness is widely thought to be a feature of vague predicates that any adequate theory of vagueness must accommodate. It takes a variety of forms. Perhaps the most familiar is the supposed existence, or at least possibility, of higher-order borderline cases—borderline borderline cases, borderline borderline borderline cases, and so forth. A second form of higherorder vagueness, what I will call ‘prescriptive’ higher-order vagueness, is thought to characterize complex predicates constructed from vague predicates by attaching operators having to do with the predicates’ proper application. For example, the predicates ‘mandates application of “old”’ and ‘can competently be called “old”’ are prescriptively higher-order vague. Higher-order vagueness appears in other guises as well,1 but these two have been of particular interest to philosophers and will be my target here. I want to expose some misconceptions about them. If I am right, higher-order vagueness is less prevalent, and less important theoretically, than is usually supposed.2 In what follows I am going to assume that vagueness is a semantic feature of natural language. For the most part I won’t discuss epistemic or pragmatic views, and I will say nothing about so-called metaphysical vagueness.
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Susanne Bobzien (2015). I—Columnar Higher‐Order Vagueness, or Vagueness is Higher‐Order Vagueness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):61-87.
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