Deviant logic and the paradoxes of self reference

Philosophical Studies 70 (3):279 - 303 (1993)
Abstract
The paradoxes of self reference have to be dealt with by anyone seeking to give a satisfactory account of the logic of truth, of properties, and even of sets of numbers. Unfortunately, there is no widespread agreement as to how to deal with these paradoxes. Some approaches block the paradoxical inferences by rejecting as invalid a move that classical logic counts as valid. In the recent literature, this deviant logic analysis of the paradoxes has been called into question.This disagreement motivates a re-examination of the philosophy of formal logic and the status of logical truths and rules. In this paper I do some of this work, and I show that this gives us the means to defend the deviant approaches against such criticisms. As a result I hope to show that these analyses of the paradoxes are worthy of more serious consideration than they have so far received.
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Citations of this work BETA
Greg Restall (1996). Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):331 – 340.
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