David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 70 (3):279 - 303 (1993)
The paradoxes of self reference have to be dealt with by anyone seeking to give a satisfactory account of the logic of truth, of properties, and even of sets of numbers. Unfortunately, there is no widespread agreement as to how to deal with these paradoxes. Some approaches block the paradoxical inferences by rejecting as invalid a move that classical logic counts as valid. In the recent literature, this deviant logic analysis of the paradoxes has been called into question.This disagreement motivates a re-examination of the philosophy of formal logic and the status of logical truths and rules. In this paper I do some of this work, and I show that this gives us the means to defend the deviant approaches against such criticisms. As a result I hope to show that these analyses of the paradoxes are worthy of more serious consideration than they have so far received.
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References found in this work BETA
Graham Priest (2006). In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent. Oxford University Press.
Bertrand Russell (2005). On Denoting. Mind 114 (456):873 - 887.
Saul A. Kripke (1975). Outline of a Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Jon Barwise (1987). The Liar: An Essay on Truth and Circularity. Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Greg Restall (1996). Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):331 – 340.
Greg Restall (2010). What Are We to Accept, and What Are We to Reject, While Saving Truth From Paradox? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 147 (3):433 - 443.
Greg Restall (2008). Modal Models for Bradwardine's Theory of Truth. Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (2):225-240.
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