Troubles with truth-making: Necessitation and projection [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 64 (1):61-74 (2006)
The main question of this paper is how to understand the notion of a truth-maker. In section 1, I show that the identification of truth-making with necessitation cannot capture the pretheoretic understanding of notions such as ‘x makes something true’. In section 2, I examine Barry Smith’s reaction to this problem: he defines truth-making as the combination of necessitation and projection. I focus on the formal part of Smith’s account, which is shown to yield undesired results. However, in section 3, I present an alternative account of projection, which fares better and can fruitfully be employed to circumvent the problems raised in section 1. Unfortunately, the account still has to face some troublemakers, as I show in the final section. I conclude, therefore, with a pessimistic view on the project of defining truth-making via necessitation and projection.
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References found in this work BETA
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
Kit Fine (1995). Ontological Dependence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:269 - 290.
John F. Fox (1987). Truthmaker. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (2):188 – 207.
Dominic Gregory (2001). Smith on Truthmakers. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):422 – 427.
Jaegwon Kim (1993). Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Mieszko Tałasiewicz, Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska, Wojciech Wciórka & Piotr Wilkin (2013). Do We Need a New Theory of Truthmaking? Some Comments on Disjunction Thesis, Conjunction Thesis, Entailment Principle and Explanation. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):591-604.
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