A Plea for Things That Are Not Quite All There: Or, Is There a Problem about Vague Composition and Vague Existence?
Journal of Philosophy 102 (8):381 - 421 (2005)
|Abstract||Orthodoxy has it that mereological composition can never be a vague matter, for if it were, then existence would sometimes be a vague matter too, and that's impossible. I accept that vague composition implies vague existence, but deny that either is impossible. In this paper I develop degree-theoretic versions of quantified modal logic and of mereology, and combine them in a framework that allows us to make clear sense of vague composition and vague existence, and the relationships between them|
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