Can consequentialism cover everything?
Utilitas 15 (2):237-47 (2003)
| Abstract | Derek Parfit, Philip Pettit and Michael Smith defend a version of consequentialism that covers everything. I argue that this version of consequentialism is false. Consequentialism, I argue, can only cover things that belong to a combination of things that agents can bring about. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,679 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesTim Mulgan (2001). How Satisficers Get Away with Murder. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (1):41 – 46.
Benjamin Sachs (2010). Consequentialism's Double-Edged Sword. Utilitas 22 (3):258-271.
Douglas W. Portmore (2008). Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism. Philosophical Studies 138 (3):409 - 427.
Campbell Brown (2005). Blameless Wrongdoing and Agglomeration: A Response to Streumer. Utilitas 17 (2):222-225.
Mozaffar Qizilbash (1999). The Rejection of Objective Consequentialism: A Comment. Utilitas 11 (01):97-105.
Douglas W. Portmore (forthcoming). Consequentialism. In Christian Miller (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Ethical Theory. Continuum.
Tim Mulgan (2001). The Demands of Consequentialism. Oxford University Press.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads48 ( #22,402 of 549,088 )Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #10,333 of 549,088 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
