David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 138 (3):409 - 427 (2008)
Dual-ranking act-consequentialism (DRAC) is a rather peculiar version of act-consequentialism. Unlike more traditional forms of act-consequentialism, DRAC doesn’t take the deontic status of an action to be a function of some evaluative ranking of outcomes. Rather, it takes the deontic status of an action to be a function of some non-evaluative ranking that is in turn a function of two auxiliary rankings that are evaluative. I argue that DRAC is promising in that it can accommodate certain features of commonsense morality that no single-ranking version of act-consequentialism can: supererogation, agent-centered options, and the self-other asymmetry. I also defend DRAC against three objections: (1) that its dual-ranking structure is ad hoc, (2) that it denies (putatively implausibly) that it is always permissible to make self-sacrifices that don’t make things worse for others, and (3) that it violates certain axioms of expected utility theory, viz., transitivity and independence.
|Keywords||Utilitarianism Consequentialism Self-other asymmetry Options Sider Splawn|
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References found in this work BETA
Shelly Kagan (1989). The Limits of Morality. Oxford University Press.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (forthcoming). Consequentialism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Peter K. Unger (1996). Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence. Oxford University Press.
Joshua Gert (2004). Brute Rationality: Normativity and Human Action. Cambridge University Press.
Michael A. Slote (1985). Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism. Routledge & Kegan.
Citations of this work BETA
Douglas W. Portmore (2009). Consequentializing. Philosophy Compass 4 (2):329-347.
Douglas W. Portmore (2012). Imperfect Reasons and Rational Options. Noûs 46 (1):24 - 60.
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