David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):89-108 (2004)
I argue that thoughts and concepts are mental representations rather than abstracta. I propose that the most important difference between the two views is that the mentalist believes that there are concept and thought tokens as well as types; this reveals that the dispute is not terminological but ontological. I proceed to offer an argument for mentalism. The key step is to establish that concepts and thoughts have lexical as well as semantic properties. I then show that this entails that concepts and thoughts are susceptible to the type/token distinction. I finish by considering some objections to the argument
|Keywords||Abstraction Concept Metaphysics Representation Thought|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Tyler Burge (1973). Reference and Proper Names. Journal of Philosophy 70 (14):425-439.
Mark Crimmins (1992). Tacitness and Virtual Beliefs. Mind and Language 7 (3):240-63.
Mark Crimmins & John Perry (1989). The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs. Journal of Philosophy 86 (12):685 - 711.
Michael Dummett (1975). Frege. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):149-188.
Jerry A. Fodor (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (2007). The Ontology of Concepts: Abstract Objects or Mental Representations? Noûs 41 (4):561-593.
Similar books and articles
Bradley Rives (2009). Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):525 – 529.
Asuncion Alvarez (2006). On Peacocke's Theory of Concepts. In E. Di Nucci & C McHugh (eds.), Content, Consciousness, and Perception: Essays in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge Scholars Press
A. Markman & H. C. Stilwell (2004). Concepts a la Modal: An Extended Review of Prinz's Furnishing the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):391-401.
Andrew R. Bailey (2007). Representation and a Science of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):62-76.
Jean-François le Ny (1990). Cognitive Science and Semantic Representations. Theoria 5 (1):85-106.
Daniel A. Weiskopf (2009). The Plurality of Concepts. Synthese 169 (1):145 - 173.
Eric Dietrich & A. Markman (2003). Discrete Thoughts: Why Cognition Must Use Discrete Representations. Mind and Language 18 (1):95-119.
Collin Rice (2013). Concept Empiricism, Content, and Compositionality. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):567-583.
Christopher Gauker (2011). Words and Images: An Essay on the Origin of Ideas. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads45 ( #58,714 of 1,699,706 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #269,935 of 1,699,706 )
How can I increase my downloads?