Are concepts mental representations or abstracta?

I argue that thoughts and concepts are mental representations rather than abstracta. I propose that the most important difference between the two views is that the mentalist believes that there are concept and thought tokens as well as types; this reveals that the dispute is not terminological but ontological. I proceed to offer an argument for mentalism. The key step is to establish that concepts and thoughts have lexical as well as semantic properties. I then show that this entails that concepts and thoughts are susceptible to the type/token distinction. I finish by considering some objections to the argument
Keywords Abstraction  Concept  Metaphysics  Representation  Thought
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 14,232
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Tyler Burge (1973). Reference and Proper Names. Journal of Philosophy 70 (14):425-439.
Michael Dummett (1975). Frege. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):149-188.

View all 12 references

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

45 ( #58,714 of 1,699,706 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #269,935 of 1,699,706 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.