Are concepts mental representations or abstracta?

Abstract
I argue that thoughts and concepts are mental representations rather than abstracta. I propose that the most important difference between the two views is that the mentalist believes that there are concept and thought tokens as well as types; this reveals that the dispute is not terminological but ontological. I proceed to offer an argument for mentalism. The key step is to establish that concepts and thoughts have lexical as well as semantic properties. I then show that this entails that concepts and thoughts are susceptible to the type/token distinction. I finish by considering some objections to the argument
Keywords Abstraction  Concept  Metaphysics  Representation  Thought
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References found in this work BETA
Tyler Burge (1973). Reference and Proper Names. Journal of Philosophy 70 (14):425-439.
Michael Dummett (1975). Frege. Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 5 (2):149-188.

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